Do the Massacres in Bayda and Banyas Portend Ethnic Cleansing to Create an Alawite State?
by Joshua Landis, Syria Comment, May 13, 2013

Map showing the cities of Latakia – Baniyas – Tartus on the Syrian coast

This question is taken up in two thoughtful articles by Hassan Hassan and Michael Young. Hassan Hassan argues that “sectarian cleansing is not being conducted for the purpose of establishing a potential state, but rather for other strategic purposes, including recruitment of Alawi fighters, deepening sectarian tensions in Assad’s favor, and ensuring a popular base of support,” (see Elizabeth O’Bagy). Michael Young sees them as a possible prelude to what may be coming if the Alawites begin to lose, but for the time being, he suggests that “ethnic cleansing” may not have been the intended result, but the massacres did serve as a shot across the bow of the Sunni population of the coast.  (see extended quotes below).

Turkey’s Foreign Minister Davutoglu claimed that Syria’s army has begun ethnically cleansing Banyas because it is losing elsewhere in the country. But Assad’s forces are not losing. According to both Liz Sly of the Washington Post and Reuters reports Assad’s forces are gaining ground in Syria, at least for the time being. This can only be cold comfort to the Sunnis along the coast who speak of their fear of ethnic cleansing.

The fighting in al-Bayda began when a bus carrying pro-regime militants, or Shabiha, was attacked, by rebel militiamen, killing at least seven and wounding more than 30, according to activists quoted by DPA. After the rebels attacked a bus, the village became “the scene of fierce fighting between the army and rebel battalions.” The brutality of the shabiha revenge on both al-Bayda and Banyas was depicted in a series of photos and videos that even by the standards of this war were shocking. The religious passions that have now colored every aspect of this fight ran out of control.

How likely is ethnic cleansing along the coast?

The likelihood of ethnic cleansing in the coastal regions is high. It will rise even higher should Assad’s troops begin to lose. The Sunni populations of the coastal cities will be the first to be targeted by Assad’s military, if it is pushed out of Damascus. Should the Alawites be compelled to fall back to the predominantly Alawite region of the mountains stretching along the western seaboard of Syria, the Sunnis of the coastal cities and eastern plan will be the first to suffer. Should Sunni militias, which are perched only kilometers from Latakia, penetrate to the city itself, Alawites may turn against the region’s Sunnis fearing that they become a fifth column. There are many precedents for this sort of defensive ethnic cleansing in the region. Zionist forces in Israel, cleared Palestinian villages of their inhabitants in 1948, rather than leave them behind Israeli lines. Armenians were driven out of Eastern Anatolia by Turks and Kurds, who claimed self-defense in their struggle against Russia in WWI. The Greek Orthodox Anatolians were driven out of Anatolia following the defeat of Greek forces which sought to conquer Anatolia in the early 1920s in an effort to resurrect the Byzantine Empire.

The Sunni cities of the Syrian coast — Latakia, Jeble, Banyas, and Tartous — had no Alawite inhabitants in the 1920s, when the French began taking censuses in Syria. Certainly, Alawite, servant girls, day laborers and peddlers may have worked in the cities, but they were alien to them. Sunnis and Alawites did not live together in any Syrian town of over 200 people, according to Jacques Weulersse, the French academic who published the most thorough and reliable study of the Alawites, Le pays des Alaouites, in 1940. Their demographic segregation was profound. The deep mistrust and hostility that separated the two communities was caused largely by religious differences. Alawites see themselves as the truest Muslims, who possess secret knowledge of God. Sunnis view Alawites to be not Muslim at all, and indeed, not even People of the Book. The many prejudices that were suppressed or attenuated during the modern national era have now reemerged and threaten to divide the two populations anew.

During the modern era, Alawites came down out of their maintain villages, migrating to the cities. Today, most of the coastal cities are only half Sunni because of the growth of Alawite neighborhoods and migration. But that population is new. Most is no older than 60 years and much of it is much newer. The same is true for Damascus, where in 1945 only 400 Alawites were recorded to be living in the capital.

An abandoned kitchen in Salma village situated in the Latakia Province (Warren Allott)

Ethnic cleansing may turn against the Alawites, as easily as it may against Sunnis. If Sunni militias win in their struggle against the regime and penetrate into the Alawite Mountains, Alawites will flee before them, rather than be vanquished. This has already been the case in six Alawite villages north of Latakia. When rebel militias entered the towns, the Alawite families hastily grabbed their possession and fled, leaving dinners on the kitchen table. Not a soul was left in them. In all likelihood, they will run to Lebanon, which is no further than an hour’s drive, The border is open.

Western policy planners have gamed out these possibilities, making them reluctant to arm rebel militias for a total victory. Although opposition leaders plead for more and better weapons to bring them a speedy victory, Western leaders have held back. The fear that three million Alawites could flee into Lebanon, destabilizing the country for decades, undoubtedly plays a role in Western reticence.  This sort of population transfer could be as disruptive to the region, as was the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948. Just as the Palestinians have not been permitted to return to their ancestral land, neither, in all probability, would the Alawites.

The fear of ethnic cleansing has increased among all populations of Syria and with good reason. Sunnis claim today that the regime is effectively trying to clear many areas of its Sunni inhabitants. One only has to look at the overwhelmingly Sunni population of the refugee camps in Turkey and Jordan to see the reason for these claims. The Assad regime has devastated whole urban neighborhoods.

Policy Implications

The strong possibility of ethnic cleansing means that foreign sponsors of both sides are proceeding with caution. If Assad’s forces are pushed out of Damascus and toward the Alawite Mountains, they could ethnically cleanse the Sunni inhabitants of the coast. If rebel militias penetrate into the Mountain villages, Alawites would almost certainly be cleansed, if they did not simply up and flee to Lebanon.

If Assad reasserts his control over rebel held parts of Syria, large populations of Sunnis would likewise flee. They would fear ruthless retribution and possible massacres.

For this reason, Western powers are searching for a political solution. It is hard to imagine the politics of compromise prevailing in Syria any time soon. Both sides remain convinced of their rectitude and eventual victory. All the same, it is not impossible that a new ethnic balance will eventually emerge in the years, if not months, ahead.

Much depends on whether rebel forces are able to unify their ranks. Their weakness is their profound fragmentation. Much too depends on external powers and their willingness to arm and finance their Syrian allies. Most Western and even some Middle Eastern leaders seem to be growing resigned to the necessity of a political solution, even as their rhetoric remains highly partisan. Erdogan, despite his bluster, seems poised to distance himself ever so slightly from Syria’s rebels. He is eager to allay Kurdish and Shiite discontent within Turkey, just as he fears any real head-butting contest with Russia and Iran over Syria.

Doha, too, seems to have hit the pause button, but continues to supply salafist militias, according to some. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are withholding arms from radical Islamist groups which have been the most effective fighters.  When the Syrian rebellion first broke out, many western pundits urged Obama to intervene if for no other reason than to seize the opportunity to eliminate Iranian influence in Syria and to crush Hizbullah in Lebanon. But to do so, would necessitate defeating the Shiite population so completely as to make it vulnerable to ethnic cleansing. What is more, the US is perhaps wiser to allow a regional balance of power to emerge between Shiites and Sunnis. If the US presses down on the scales of power too dramatically in one direction, as it did in Iraq, bad things can happen. Because the Sunnis in Iraq were so thoroughly purged from state institutions and driven from positions of authority, they have gone on the warpath and remain radicalized. What is more, the US will withdraw, causing the balance of power to swing back toward a balance reflecting regional power arrangements. Better for America not to intervene itself, but to work through regional allies. In the case of Syria, these allies are Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel. They have more permanent interests in Syria and will balance Iran and Iraq out of necessity, rather than out of some momentary fit of anxiety or altruism.

Mihrac Ural, sometimes called Ali Kyali, who has emerged as a leading Shabiha leader.

Key to the heightened fear of Sunnis along the coast, is the growth and power of the Shabiha, or Alawite militias, which have been adopting a raw religious and increasingly Alawite nationalist rhetoric. No one stands out among the Shabiha leaders more than Mihrac Ural, or as he is often called, Ali Kyali, of late. He is a Turkish Alawite who fled Turkey around 1981 and was given Syrian citizenship by Hafiz al-Assad. He is credited to have introduced Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader, to the Assads and to have married a secretary of Rifaat al-Assad. The PKK’s first conference took place on Syrian territory in July 1981. Turkish authorities are accusing Ural of masterminding the recent bombing in Reyhanli, Turkey. He is in all likelihood, the leader of the Banyas incident as well.

In this video recorded a few days before the Banyas massacre, Mihrac Ural explains why Banyas is key to the defense of the coastal region and must be cleaned of rebel combatants.

“Banias is the only route for these traitors to the sea,” he says in this video. “Jableh, due to the national forces surrounding it, cannot become a pathway or a coastal headquarters for the enemy. But Banias could, and the whole game in Banias is playing out based on this calculation.”

It is necessary, as soon as possible, to surround Banias, and I mean (someone in audience says “cleanse [tathir] sir”)…surround Banias and start the cleansing….

…The title of the Syrian Resistance is the “cleansing and liberation”, these two. We do not have any political or governing ambitions, as long as the state exists and the governing power exists. We don’t interfere in criminal or civilian matters…..

…The aim of the Syrian Resistance is the liberation of the country (watan) and if we’re needed within this week, we will join the battles in Banias and perform our patriotic duty. Everyone will see how the Syrian Resistance fights.

We fought from Amani, Kassab to Nabii Al Mir…Point 45, Qastal Al Maath, Al Mazraa. Mafraq Al Saraya, Al Mafrqah Al Bassit, Al Arjaa, Al Maydan, Bayt Fares, Al Rawda, Markaz Al Hataab, Borj Al Shaqra, Bayt Hnayn and I was ambushed in Bayt Hnayn along with my comrades and I’m still injured from that ambush. [These villages are situated to the north of Latakia]

Within this line (the cities he just listed), this is the front-line that’s always on fire. The Syrian resistance fought in all these places and collected realistic information from the enemy on the ground. It taught them a lesson. The resistance gave 27 martyrs.

Our plan has always been attack, attack, attack. Those who ask us “OK, so you entered the village, who’s going to hold it”, it doesn’t matter, our job is to cleanse and liberate and its up to the army to hold the ground, when the time comes when the army can’t hold the ground, then it will be a different story, and the Syrian Resistance will have to take additional measures….

You need to pay attention to the story of Banias, the only route from these traitors to the sea. It should be surrounded, liberated and cleansed as soon as possible, and al salam alikum.

Ali Kyali speech about Banias – Original Facebook posting

Destroyed Alawite Shrine of Saydna al-Khidr

According to “Terrorism, 1992 – 1995: A Chronology of Events and a Selectively Annotated Bibliography By Edward F. Mickolus, Mihrac Ural had become leader of the outlawed Turkish People’s Liberation Party Acilcier Organization. The group espouses a Marxist-Leninist ideology and holds an anti-U.S., anti-NATO position. It considers that the Turkish government is under the control of Western imperialism. He seeks to destroy this control by both violent and democratic means. The DHKP-C splinter group called Acilciler, or “Urgent Ones,” has about 500 members and operates from Syria under the name of the “Hatay Liberation Army.” Mihrac’s past connections to the Kurdish Marxist group, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), is discussed here as well as his possible connection to the US embassy bombing in Turkey.  He is now a wanted man and has $100k bounty on his head.

Mihrac Ural is not an out and out Alawite nationalist. He is loyal to the rhetoric of Arab nationalism and defers to the “Syrian Army.” All the same, Turkish Alawites have a particular sensibility. They have not been imbued with Arab nationalist ideology and retain a less self-conscious connection to their religion and traditions. A number of my Turkish Alawite friends have a much deeper knowledge of Alawite religion than do my Syrian Alawite friends. Most Syrian Alawites have internalized the Syrian, Arab nationalism of the regime, such that they deny Alawite nationalist ambitions vehemently. They also cling to the notion that they are good Muslims, rejecting any notion that they believe in Ali as the supreme creator or have a separate religion. Most Turkish Alawites have fewer qualms along these lines. Some have turned away from religion altogether, embracing the secularism of Kemalism, but others have turned inward and embraced Alawite religion as a wellspring of their identity. This makes the emergence of Mihrac Ural particularly interesting. He embraces Alawitism, is proud to sit with Alawite religious sheikhs in his photos, and to defend religious shrines. Some of his photos show him sitting in front of a large library of books and are designed to depict him as a man of wisdom and deep learning. Turkish Alawites may play an important role in leading their Syrian coreligionists toward Alawite nationalism. If so, Mihrac Ural is a man to watch. There is no doubt that he speaks the assurance of a leader on a mission if not a prophet. The original Alawite founder of the Baath Party – Zaki Arsuzi – was from Alexandretta (Hatay). His conversion to Arabism was shaped by Turkey’s takeover of his region. It would be ironic if a Turkish Alawite led the spiritual and possibly nationalist awakening of the Alawites.

[End - Personal News]

I will be traveling in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon for the next six weeks and may not be able to post. Matt Barber, the Syria Video team, and Aron Lund will be able to keep posting on Syria Comment, although not frequently.

News Round Up

Lessons from a massacre that Assad looks to exploit
Hassan Hassan, May 08, 2013, the National

The recent carnage in the Syrian coastal city of Banias over the weekend, among the most grisly in the country’s two-year-long conflict, offers lessons into the grim calculations of Bashar Al Assad. Read Article

Syria Update: Assad Targets Sunni along Syria’s Coast
May 10, 2013 – Elizabeth O’Bagy

Although Assad has attempted to consolidate the Alawites behind him and to fortify his position in the northern Alawi coastal mountains and Tal Kalakh in the south, conditions on the ground contradict assertions that Assad is creating an Alawi rump state…..

in a video posted on YouTube, the leader of an Alawi militia in the coastal region, along with an Alawi religious leader, discusses plans to “cleanse Baniyas of the traitors.”

New phase in Syria’s war will bring blood to the coast
Michael Young, May 9, 2013, The National

….If the Alawites ever decide to create a rump state, one of their objectives will be to ensure that Sunnis do not challenge this plan. That means Sunnis must either be terrorised into silence or, in the worst case, forced out of coastal areas. The Baniyas and Bayda killings, while extraordinarily brutal, seemed primarily designed to achieve the first aim. Thousands of Sunnis reportedly left the city in fear, but appeared to be heading toward other coastal cities, namely Tartous, south of Baniyas, and Jableh, to its north.

However, the massacres were a reminder that worse may come, especially if the regime makes headway in Homs and Qusayr, allowing it to seal a major Sunni evacuation route. Sunnis in the north-east increasingly feel isolated from their brethren elsewhere in Syria. That is how the regime wants it. The Sunnis’ sense of vulnerability will make them more reluctant to side with the rebellion, and their presence as potential hostages will make Mr Al Assad’s enemies think twice before mounting military operations in coastal areas.

This may be the best the Assad regime can hope to achieve, since wholesale ethnic cleansing would be a major endeavour. There is still a significant Sunni population in coastal cities such as Tartous and Latakiya, and in the latter, Sunnis form a majority. Even if they were driven out for some reason, the consequences could be disastrous for the city itself, which would lose not only a large portion of its population, but many of its most dynamic economic actors…..Mr Al Assad has no plans to abandon Damascus. However, we are witnessing a consolidation of the Alawite statehood option as a fallback position. The Syrian conflict is entering a new phase, where long-term territorial plans and alliances are taking shape. And the ensuing violence can only increase as the stakes become higher.

Recent violence against Sunni communities in Syria’s coastal region raises new concern over sectarianism in Syria. It also suggests to some that Assad will move to form an Alawi state. In fact, these events are perpetrated to demonstrate force and to drive a sectarian narrative that strengthens Assad’s base. Assad’s support in Qardaha has weakened, an influx of internally displaced persons has transfigured the coastal region, and there are opportunities to exploit these fluctuations in Assad’s position there.

Possible ethnic cleansing in Iraq if new sectarian war starts: Ned parker – “the threat of more bloodshed between Sunnis and Shiites and the eventual breakup of the country”

Askari said he doubted there would be a new civil war because Sunnis know how much they lost in the sectarian conflict during the U.S. occupation.

“Without the American Army, no single Sunni could have stayed in Baghdad. They would have been cleansed,” he said. “Now there are no Americans. If sectarian war ignited, for sure they would lose Baghdad and most of the other provinces.”

All that would be left is their stronghold, Anbar province, Askari said, where Al Qaeda would gain strength and terrorize the Sunni population.

Those Arguing US Should Stay Out of Syria

With or Without Us
By Fareed Zakaria, Monday, May. 13, 2013 – Time Magazine

Those urging the U.S. to intervene in Syria are certain of one thing: If we had intervened sooner, things would be better in that war-torn country. Had the Obama Administration gotten involved earlier, there would be less instability and fewer killings. We would not be seeing, in John McCain’s words of April 28, “atrocities that are on a scale that we have not seen in a long, long time.”

In fact, we have seen atrocities much worse than those in Syria very recently, in Iraq under U.S. occupation only few years ago. From 2003 to 2012, despite there being as many as 180,000 American and allied troops in Iraq, somewhere between 150,000 and 300,000 Iraqi civilians died and about 1.5 million fled the country. Jihadi groups flourished in Iraq, and al-Qaeda had a huge presence there. The U.S. was about as actively engaged in Iraq as is possible, and yet more terrible things happened there than in Syria. Why?

The point here is not to make comparisons among atrocities. The situation in Syria is much like that in Iraq–and bears little resemblance to that in Libya–so we can learn a lot from our experience there. Joshua Landis, the leading scholar on Syria, points out that it is the last of the three countries of the Levant where minority regimes have been challenged by the majority. In Lebanon, the Christian elite were displaced through a bloody civil war that started in the 1970s and lasted 15 years. In Iraq in 2003, the U.S. military quickly displaced the Sunni elite, handing the country over to the Shi’ites–but the Sunnis have fought back ferociously for almost a decade. Sectarian killings persist in Iraq to this day.

Syria is following a similar pattern. the country has a Sunni majority. The regime is Alawite, a Shi’ite subsect that makes up 12% of the population, but it also draws some support from other minorities–Druze, Armenians and others–who worry about their fate in a majoritarian Syria. These fears might be justified. Consider what has happened to the Christians of Iraq. There were as many as 1.4 million of them before the Iraq war. There are now about 500,000, and many of their churches have been destroyed. Christian life in Iraq, which has survived since the days of the Bible, is in real danger of being extinguished by the current regime in Baghdad.

All the features of Syria’s civil war that are supposedly the result of U.S. nonintervention also appeared in Iraq despite America’s massive intervention there. In Iraq under U.S. occupation, many Sunni groups banded together with jihadi forces from the outside; some even broke bread with al-Qaeda. Shi’ite militias got support from Iran. Both sides employed tactics that were brutal beyond belief–putting electric drills through people’s heads, burning others alive and dumping still breathing victims into mass graves.

These struggles get vicious for a reason: the stakes are very high. The minority regime fights to the end because it fears for its life once out of power. The Sunnis of Iraq fought–even against the mighty American military–because they knew that life under the Shi’ites would be ugly, as it has proved to be. The Alawites in Syria will fight even harder because they are a smaller minority and have further to fall.

Would U.S. intervention–no-fly zones, arms, aid to the opposition forces–make things better? It depends on what one means by better. It would certainly intensify the civil war. It would also make the regime of Bashar Assad more desperate. Perhaps Assad has already used chemical weapons; with his back against the wall, he might use them on a larger scale. As for external instability, Landis points out that if U.S. intervention tipped the balance against the Alawites, they might flee Syria into Lebanon, destabilizing that country for decades. Again, this pattern is not unprecedented. Large numbers on the losing side have fled wars in the Middle East, from Palestinians in 1948 to Iraq’s Sunnis in the past decade.

If the objective is actually to reduce the atrocities and minimize potential instability, the key will be a political settlement that gives each side an assurance that it has a place in the new Syria. That was never achieved in Iraq, which is why, despite U.S. troops and arms and influence, the situation turned into a violent free-for-all. If some kind of political pact can be reached, there’s hope for Syria. If it cannot, U.S. assistance to the rebels or even direct military intervention won’t change much: Syria will follow the pattern of Lebanon and Iraq–a long, bloody civil war. And America will be in the middle of it.

President Obama: Keep Your Nerve on Syria

by Robert E. Hunter

“Then we’ll have done all we can.”“Very heartless.”“It’s safer to be heartless than mindless. History is the triumph of the heartless over the mindless.”Yes, Prime Minister.

President Barack Obama, it is said, has painted himself into a corner with his repeated statements that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad government will be a “game changer” or cross a “red line.” The difficulty of definitions has produced what must have been one of the most ambiguous letters ever to be put on White House stationery. It came as a response to a demand from two US Senators about presidential policy in the event of such weapons use.

More accurately, however, the president can be said to have painted himself into a corner with Syria on two occasions, initially as early as August 2011, and repeated since, by declaring that “Assad must go.”

Of course, Assad has not gone, thus demonstrating once again the first rule of being US President: never call for something, especially in a simple declaratory sentence, if you are not prepared to follow through and make it happen.

This recitation is not meant to be an attack on the US president. It is an introduction to what has to be a genuine dilemma, indeed, a series of dilemmas, which come in several forms.

Syria’s Future

The first dilemma regards the potentiality of a positive outcome in Syria. Assad and company are engaged in the massive slaughter of their own people, which, along with those killed by the rebels, numbers more than 70,000 by a recent (likely conservative) count, plus the creation of more than a million refugees. There is meanwhile no resolution in sight of what has become a full-scale civil war.

Let us assume that Assad is killed (or decides to seek a safe haven) tomorrow. What then? It is a vast stretch of the imagination to believe that the killing would then stop.

What is happening in Syria is radically different from what happened in the so-called “Arab spring” in Tunisia, Egypt, or even Libya. This is not primarily a matter of whether a leader who stayed too long and was too repressive will go; but whether a particular minority will continue to be able to dominate the rest of the population, or, with “regime change,” whether there will be a bloody free-for-all competition for power. None of the other three regime changes were about that.

More relevant is what happened in Iraq, when the US and partners, by invading in 2003, overturned centuries of admittedly unjust domination of a majority (Shi’ite) by a minority (Sunni). Or what is happening, or rather not happening, in Bahrain, where the situation is just the reverse but has been kept in check by military power, much of which has been applied by neighboring Saudi Arabia, with the US, concerned about its base in Bahrain for the Fifth Fleet, at best “turning a blind eye.”

It’s therefore hard to see what the United States, or any combination of outsiders, could usefully do — not to help overthrow Assad and his Alawite-dominated military (that can be done) — but to help “shape” a future in Syria that won’t lead to even more bloody chaos before something approaching “stability” could ensue. Even if that were possible, it would likely take the form of a new suppression, but by the majority (Sunni) over various minorities.

Public Opinion 

The second dilemma — perhaps it should be first — is related to whether the American people are ready and willing to see the US engaged in yet another Middle East war. The answer (“No”) is clear, but so far policy is not — hence the dilemma.

There should be no indulgence in the nonsense that all could be accomplished by providing more lethal arms to the rebels, imposing a no-fly zone, or using air power directly. That would be relatively sterile in today’s military taxology, but even if/when successful, it leads back to the first dilemma. And if unsuccessful, the US would then be called upon to do what, in current jargon, is called “boots on the ground” — that is, invasion. There should be no nonsense, however, about the US being able, as in Libya, to “lead from behind.” Even though the British and the French (the latter was the former mandatory power in Syria after World War I) would like to see something done, they are this time ready to hold the US coat, but not lead themselves.

To his credit, the president so far has been wary of getting more deeply engaged, presumably due to a combination of his awareness of the two dilemmas above, the second of which (US public opinion), if ignored, would surely take attention away from what he clearly sees as his legacy: repairs to the heavily-damaged US economy (and the global financial system) and his historical goal, which can be summarized in a few simple words: the promotion of equality in American society.

Regional Context

The third dilemma derives from the manner in which the conflict in Syria began. It did have domestic roots (as in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya), but it also had external causes and active agents, notably a desire by leading Sunni states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and to a lesser degree, Turkey) to right the informal and rough regional “balance of power” between them and Shi’a states that was so heavily upset by the US invasion of Iraq. This came after the spread of the “disease” from revolutionary Shi’a Iran had both been almost entirely contained in the region and had most of its fires banked at home. Some Sunni states still fear contagion, however, notably Saudi Arabia, where oil lands are heavily concentrated in Shi’a territories (hence Riyadh’s desire to get rid of the Alawite rule in Syria).

So here it is: an already slow-rolling civil war across the region, pitting Sunnis versus Shi’as, but only in part about religion, is also about competitions for power. In this case, it’s an essentially four-cornered competition among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey, the first three of which have as much to do in fueling the current confrontation with Iran as does its nuclear program.

Would the overthrow of the Assad regime cause this regional civil war to intensify? Or would it lead to a new, informal balance among religious groupings that would be reasonably “stable,” whatever that means in today’s roiling Middle East? It would take a Dr. Pangloss to argue the case for stability over more competition and even less stability and predictability about the future of inter-state relations and internal developments.

Non-governmental Actors

Dilemma number four flows from the above. As the civil war has continued and intensified, Sunni Islamist militants, including elements of al-Qaeda, Wahhabis and Salafists, have increasingly become engaged. That should be no surprise. These groups batten on conflict, especially a conflict with intense emotion and deep-seated religious inspiration. Thus even with Assad gone — perhaps by magic wand tomorrow — would the outcome of the civil war be ruled by a Sunni strongman, pacifying the country by force? Or solidification of another base for continuing terrorist operations by some of our and our allies’ worst enemies?….

Ambassador’s Pickering and Crocker on Syria (America’s two most senior retired ambassadors) from FP

Pickering has been working on a plan to offer a way forward. This would include dropping the precondition that required Assad step down for talks to begin — an idea Kerry embraced this week — an immediate humanitarian ceasefire across Syria, and a U.N.-brokered election process that would lead toward a transitional government.

While all sides note that there are no good answers and no easy solutions, Pickering notes that slow diplomatic action has not increased America’s odds of finding the best outcome among a slew of difficult options.

“I think we have tended to put the diplomatic side aside as in the ‘too hard’ category,” Pickering says. “We need to move this fairly soon or we are going to lose the opposition — certainly the al Qaedization of the opposition has been fairly serious and the fractionation of the opposition is very large.”

On the other hand, those who’ve seen the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from a front-row diplomatic seat say caution is the better part of policy prudence when it comes to Syria.

“There are no good options here and the pressure is growing to do something because that is what we do, we do things,” says former Amb. Ryan Crocker, who served as ambassadors to both Iraq and Syria and now is a senior fellow at Yale University. ” But everything of significance I can think of doing is likely to make the situation worse, not better and put us in a worse position, not a better one.” In Crocker’s view, the stalemate with the Russians at the United Nations regarding more concerted action has actually benefited America.

“The Russians are actually doing us a favor and I don’t think they are actually going to come off it because they see a rebel victory as deeply destabilizing for the region and particularly for them,” Crocker says.  “I hope they go on blocking any Security Council action because if you get an ‘all necessary measures’ resolution, then you are in a very exposed position if you don’t use all necessary means.”  

What Crocker does favor, however, is more humanitarian aid and non-lethal support, and greater backing  for the Syrian opposition, which gathered this week in Istanbul, in the effort to come up with a vision for a post-Assad political transition.

Crocker, however, rejects the idea that Syria is simply Iraq in a different form. He cites the willingness of the Assad regime to wage war by any means necessary as among the key differences, meaning more weapons for the opposition will not necessarily lead to less fighting.

“They have been training, equipping, and organizing for this for a very long time,” he says of Assad’s forces.  “They have got the weaponry, they are ruthless and they know what the alternatives are.  Whatever you say about them, they will stand and fight and you did not have that situation with a government in either Bosnia or Iraq.” ….

“Broader regional fighting could bring the U.S. and Iran into direct conflict, a potentially major military undertaking for the U.S. A U.S.-Iran confrontation linked to the Syrian crisis could spread the area of conflict even to Afghanistan. Russia would benefit from America’s being bogged down again in the Middle East. China would resent U.S. destabilization of the region because Beijing needs stable access to energy from the Middle East.

To minimize these potential consequences, U.S. military intervention would have to achieve a decisive outcome relatively quickly through the application of overwhelming force. That would require direct Turkish involvement, which seems unlikely given Turkey’s internal difficulties, particularly its tenuous relations with its substantial Kurdish minority.

The various schemes that have been proposed for a kind of tiddlywinks intervention from around the edges of the conflict-no-fly zones, bombing Damascus and so forth-would simply make the situation worse. None of the proposals would result in an outcome strategically beneficial for the U.S. On the contrary, they would produce a more complex, undefined slide into the worst-case scenario. The only solution is to seek Russia’s and China’s support for U.N.-sponsored elections in which, with luck, Assad might be “persuaded” not to participate.”

The struggle for Syria
Op-Ed – LATimes
Any military intervention by the U.S. would only exacerbate the conflict.
By Majid Rafizadeh, May 7, 2013

My cousin, Ramez, was dead before the echoes of the gunshot that killed him stopped ringing. His 4-year-old daughter, Zeynab, watched him fall on a narrow street in Damascus, but she never heard the shot because she is deaf. She held onto his lifeless hand until a second bullet tore into her chest. She survived.

I tell this story to make it clear that my family and I have experienced the civil war firsthand. Ramez was just one of several family members who lost their lives in the battle against Bashar Assad’s police state. My mother, sister and brother, alongside millions of other war-torn Syrian refugees, were forced to flee to Lebanon and then on to Baghdad.

But despite the seriousness and severity of the situation, I don’t believe that the United States should intervene militarily in Syria. Any direct or indirect intervention by the U.S. would exacerbate Syria’s internal conflict and increase the number of people being displaced and killed.

The US can’t remake Syria
By Andrew J. Bacevich, May 08, 2013

As you contemplate the ongoing violence in Syria, here are the three things to keep in mind.

First, the United States undoubtedly possesses the wherewithal to topple the regime of Bashar Assad. On this score, the hawks are surely right. Whether acting alone, with allies, or through proxies, Washington over the past decade or so has demonstrated an impressive capacity to overthrow governments. Skeptical? Consider the fate of various evil-doers on whom we trained our gun-sights in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.

Second, once Washington has removed Assad as it did Saddam Hussein, the likelihood of the United States being able to put things right — creating a “new” Syria that is stable, humane, and grateful for American assistance — is approximately nil. Here the evidence supports the doves. Skeptical? Again, consider the course of events in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya once the evil-doers departed the scene.

These two points define the poles around which the policy debate in Washington incessantly revolves. In one camp are those who are fired by humanitarian concerns or persuaded that Assad threatens US (or Israeli) security. They are keen to put American muscle once more to work, and chastise President Obama for his reluctance to act. In the second camp are those wary of the United States once again stumbling into a quagmire. They commend Obama for (thus far) exercising restraint, fearing that American meddling will create more problems than it will solve.

This debate overlooks the third point, which obviates the first two: Whatever Obama does or doesn’t do about Syria won’t affect the larger trajectory of events. Except to Syrians, the fate of Syria per se doesn’t matter any more than the fate of Latvia or Laos. The context within which the upheaval there is occurring — what preceded it and what it portends — matters a great deal. Yet on this score, Washington is manifestly clueless and powerles

History possesses a remarkable capacity to confound. Right when the path ahead appears clear — remember when the end of the Cold War seemed to herald a new age of harmony? — it makes a U-turn. The Syrian civil war provides only the latest indication that one such radical reversal is occurring before our very eyes. For Syria bears further witness to the ongoing disintegration of the modern Middle East and the reemergence of an assertive Islamic world, a development likely to define the 21st century.

Recall that the modern Middle East is a relatively recent creation. It emerged from the wreckage of World War I, the handiwork of cynical and devious European imperialists. As European (and especially British) power declined after World War II, the United States, playing the role of willing patsy, assumed responsibility for propping up this misbegotten product of European venality — a dubious inheritance, if there ever was one.

Now it’s all coming undone. Today, from the Maghreb to Pakistan, the order created by the West to serve Western interests is succumbing to an assault mounted from within. Who are the assailants? People intent on exercising that right to self-determination that President Woodrow Wilson bequeathed to the world nearly 100 years ago. What these multitudes are seeking remains to be seen. But they don’t want and won’t countenance outside interference.

Anyone fancying that the United States can forestall this quest for self-determination should think again. Anyone who thinks Washington can bend the process to suit our own purposes needs to undertake a remedial study of the Iraq War.

Americans have long entertained the conceit that we are bigger than history. We provide the drumbeat to which others march. Sorry: Not so.

By way of comparison, think of those stories about the sea encroaching on some Nantucket or Plum Island home. Those immediately affected might delude themselves into thinking that a bit of sand replenishment will save the day. Grown-ups know better. Ultimately, the winds and tides, reinforced of late by climate change, will have their way.

So too with the Greater Middle East. Pressure on Obama to “do something” about Syria continues to mount. Perhaps he’ll refuse. I hope so. Or perhaps he’ll cave, with Syria becoming yet another active theater in what has become America’s endless War To Be Named Later. One thing is certain: US intervention in Syria won’t affect the tsunami of change that is engulfing the Islamic world.

Former Defense Chief Gates says ‘no’ to direct military involvement in Syria
New York Daily News

says he oversaw wars that began with quick regime change “and we all know what happened after that.”

For Intervention

Fouad Ajami: “In Syria’s war, the lines that matter aren’t red”

….The remarkable thing about this drawn-out fight, now entering its third year, is the passivity of the United States. A region of traditional American influence has been left to fend for itself.

Of course, these sectarian enmities do not lend themselves to an outsider’s touch. Nor did Obama call up these furies; they cannot be laid at his doorstep. But the unwillingness of his administration to make a clean break with Assad helped radicalize the Syrian rebellion. The landscape would have been altered by American help. A no-fly zone near the border with Turkey could have sheltered and aided the rebels. An early decision to arm the rebellion would have leveled the killing field. Four of the president’s principal foreign policy advisers from his first term advocated giving weapons to the rebels — Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, CIA Director David Petraeusand the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey. But the president overrode them, his caution of no help in a conflict of such virulence.

Under the gaze of the world, Obama instead drew a red line on the use of chemical weapons and warned that his calculus would change if these weapons were used or moved around. He thus placed his credibility in the hands of the Syrian dictator and, in the midst of a storm of his own making, fell back on lawyerly distinctions.

A Greater Middle East, an Islamic world, used to American campaigns of rescue — Kuwait in 1991, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011 — is now witnessing the ebb of American power and responsibility. Obama has held his fire in the face of great slaughter, and truth be known, congressional and popular opinion have given him a pass. America has wearied of Middle Eastern wars.

Syrian rebels sure that the American cavalry would turn up after this or that massacre have been bitterly disappointed. It’s the tragic luck of the Syrians that their rebellion has happened on the watch of an American president who has made a fetish of caution, who has seen the risks of action and overlooked the consequences of abdication…..

Misc.

Inside Syria’s siege economy
By Keith Proctor, May 8, 2013:

As the fighting in Syria drags on, resource flows have adapted to accommodate life inside — and to support the opposition forces vying for control…..

“I know the Blond Duck is a dictator,” said one young Syrian who requested anonymity, using a common nickname for President Assad. “But the opposition, they’re not about freedom, either. Do you really think that Jihadists will bring freedom?”

Like many young Syrians caught between the regime and rebels, he said, he simply wanted stability.

Whatever the outcome, he may be sadly disappointed. For most analysts, it’s not a question of whether the regime will fall, but when. Following that, the persistent fear is that the revolution, to use Jacques Mallet du Pan’s phrase, will devour its children. “If the Blond Duck falls,” the young Syrian said, “there will be complete anarchy.”

And if that happens, a war that has for months swirled around the still-peaceful center of Aleppo will finally rush in.

In Syria and Beyond, the Tyrant as Target
By FEISAL G. MOHAMED, May 11, 2013, New York Times

Eliminating a tyrant is not virtuous if one is knowingly creating even greater conditions of disorder and destruction. Legitimate tyrannicide must flow from a good-faith effort to institute justice. To return to the example of Syria, when we hear news of extreme violence committed (or, in recent reports, claims of the use of chemical weapons) not just by government forces but by opposition forces, too, we must be led to wonder if the latter aim to replace Assad’s tyranny with one of their own making

The effort to institute justice is one of several restrictions that we might impose on tyrannicide. At worst it is an alibi for the execution of political enemies. The most familiar examples of this tendency arose during the cold war, when a tyrant meriting assassination was one with Soviet sympathies and autocrats pliable to Western directives were deemed benign. To avoid this pitfall, we might first define a tyrant in terms familiar throughout history: a leader who rules by force, who has an incontrovertible record of directly ordering large-scale murder, and who is actively using a position of authority to engage in the slaughter of innocents. We might further define that person as a “rogue” in his refusal to participate in the community of nations, so that diplomatic and nonviolent restraint of his actions seems unachievable.

Cases in which tyrannicide seems an especially appropriate remedy will be those where the tyrant is a chief source of destructive commands in the polity, rather than presiding incompetently over a reckless and loosely organized military or security apparatus. In such an eventuality, the removal of the tyrant holds the strong possibility of ending the horrors taking place under his rule. But that removal, as we have said, must arise from the aspiration to implement a new and more peaceable civil order…..

Syrian rebel leader Salim Idriss admits difficulty of unifying fighters
By David Enders | McClatchy Foreign Staff

Savage Online Videos Fuel Syria’s Descent Into Madness
By Aryn BakerMay 12, 2013

Too Close for Comfort: Syrians in Lebanon, Beirut/Washington | 13 May 2013
Sahar Atrache, Crisis Group’s Middle East & North Africa Analyst

As the Syrian conflict increasingly implicates and spills over into Lebanon, a priority for its government and international partners must be to tackle the refugee crisis, lest it ignite domestic conflict that a weak state and volatile region can ill afford.

“Lebanon’s fate historically has been deeply intertwined with Syria’s. As Syria heads even more steadily toward catastrophe, there is every reason for Lebanese of all persuasions to worry about their own country — and to do something about it.”

Israeli Bombs and American Qualms: Assessing Syria, by Andrew Exum, May 6, 2013

U.S. and Russia agree to Syria talks, But Anti-Assad Opposition May Refuse to Participate By Jonathan S. Landay and Hannah Allam | McClatchy Newspapers

Congress Speaks With a Loud, Muddled Voice on Syria By Paul Richter | Los Angeles Times

Pentagon Plans for the Worst in Syria By Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes | The Wall Street Journal (Subscription Required)

Sen. Menendez: Senator Menendez Introduces Syria Stabilization Act of 2013, 2013-05-06, Legislation Provides for Lethal Weapons to Vetted Syrian

Turkey Fears Russia Too Much to Intervene in Syria, Soner Cagaptay May 6 2013, – Opposition, Sanctions Weapon Sales and Petroleum to the Assad Regime, While Delivering Humanitarian Assistance and Planning …

by Aron Lund for Syria Comment

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which has a great Syria resource site, just released my new paper on the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. They’re also about to release a second report by Raphaël Lefèvre, a French scholar who recently published a well-received book on the Syrian Ikhwan, called Ashes of Hama. Keep your eyes open for that – I’ve had a look at an earlier draft, and it was great stuff.

My own paper can be downloaded in English or Arabic, or (if you’re the lazy kind of Syria watcher) you can just skim through the summary right here:

by Aron Lund for Syria Comment

The Islamic Ahrar al-Sham Movement, which is the leading faction of the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) and probably the biggest salafi group in Syria, has issued a statement about Jabhat al-Nosra’s recent declaration of allegiance to al-Qaida’s Ayman al-Zawahiri. The Ahrar al-Sham statement is available in Arabic on Aaron Zelin’s Jihadology, always the go-to place for source material on jihadi groups. It has been translated into English by Misr Panorama, here (added May 6).

The background is as follows. In early April, Zawahiri issued a statement in support of the revolution in Syria and called for an Islamic state there. This was followed by a message from the emir of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI, i.e. al-Qaida in Iraq), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who finally acknowledged the long-known fact that Jabhat al-Nosra was an ISI offshoot and that they would henceforth work under a common name and flag as “the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria”. The day after, Jabhat al-Nosra’s leader Abu Mohammed al-Joulani issued a surprisingly sharp rejoinder. He admitted that Jabhat al-Nosra had indeed been supported by the ISI from the very beginning, and was thankful for it, but he also said he hadn’t been consulted on Abu Bakr’s announcement and denied that the groups would merge. On the other hand, Abu Mohammed took the occasion to formally “renew” his pledge of allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the top emir of al-Qaida.

This procedure, “al-bayaa” in Arabic, is not mere rhetoric; rather it is loaded with religious and political significance for hardcore Islamists like these. It essentially means that Abu Mohammed, and by extention Jabhat al-Nosra, promises to follow every order from Zawahiri as long as this does not contravene sharia law. It is a step in the same process that al-Qaida in Iraq went through, when Abu Moussaab al-Zarqawi first declared his allegiance to Osama bin Laden. His group, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, was then renamed al-Qaida in Mesopotamia, after Bin Laden responded by formally blessing their union, to signify that it was now a bona fide al-Qaida wing (it then folded into the ISI in 2006, but that’s another matter). Later, the GSPC of Algeria and Shabab al-Mujahedin of Somalia went through the same steps to become formal al-Qaida branches, and now Jabhat al-Nosra is doing it.

The new Ahrar al-Sham statement, signed May 4, 2013, criticizes both Abu Mohammed el-Joulani and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. According to Ahrar al-Sham, their statements were divisive, lacking in realism and “put the interest of the group before the interest of the Umma”, i.e. the Islamic nation as a whole.

Ahrar al-Sham warns that Jabhat al-Nosra’s open affiliation to al-Qaida will help the regime and that it will “regionalize” the crisis by bringing other parties into the conflict, presumably in reference to US and European hostility to al-Qaida.

While frank and critical, the Ahrar al-Sham statement is not really hostile to Jabhat al-Nosra or al-Qaida. Rather it is written in the tone of honest advise for an ally who has committed a damaging mistake. In fact, the statement expresses disappointment in Jabhat al-Nosra, since Ahrar al-Sham says it had previously only seen good deeds from the group and had expected better. Ahrar al-Sham also takes care to point out that they agree in principle with the al-Qaida goal of establishing an transnational Islamic state, but asks for a bit of realism and patience given the current situation. They also say that none of today’s Islamist factions is strong enough to assume religious leadership over the Muslim community, thereby obliquely criticizing al-Qaida, ISI and Jabhat al-Nosra while also denying that they have rival leadership ambitions.

Previously, the Jabhat al-Nosra and ISI declarations had been criticized in similarly nuanced statements by the FSA-aligned SILF Islamist alliance and several other opposition factions, including the mainstream pro-Western and pro-GCC leaderships.

But it took Ahrar al-Sham almost a month to respond. The group has recently grown a lot, incorporating smaller SIF factions, so they probably had to go through some internal consultations before producing a statement on a sensitive matter like this. The SIF as an alliance has still not taken a public position on the Jabhat al-Nosra/al-Qaida affair, but I expect it will follow. And Ahrar al-Sham is by now so dominant within the SIF that their word could almost be taken to represent the SIF.

This dispute illustrates the subtle but real distinction between al-Qaida’s radically internationalist salafi-jihadism and the more locally rooted, Syria-focused and somewhat pragmatic salafi program of Ahrar al-Sham and the SIF. For more on that, see my recent report on the SIF and its member factions.

– Aron Lund

by Aron Lund for Syria Comment

The Haqq Battalions Gathering, a militant group in the Hama province, announced in mid-April 2013 that they are joining the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF). This is the first time since the SIF’s creation in December 2012 that an independent outside organization of any consequence decides to join the front. Previously, some small local factions had been coopted into SIF member factions, but the Haqq Battalions are joining as full members.

The Syrian Islamic Front

The SIF is one of Syria’s largest and most powerful Islamist militant alliances. It’s smaller but seems more cohesive than the large Syrian Islamic Liberation Front network (SILF), which comprises major Islamist factions like the Farouq Battalions of Homs and northern Syria, Suqour al-Sham of Idleb, the Islam Brigade of Damascus, and the Tawhid Brigade of Aleppo. The SIF is also almost certainly larger in numbers than Jabhat al-Nosra, although the latter group steals most of the limelight. Ideologically and politically, it sets itself apart from both sides.

Unlike the SILF, the more hardline SIF has no relation to the Western- and Gulf backed ”official” opposition frameworks, like the National Coalition of George Sabra (after the resignation of Ahmed Moadh al-Khatib) or Ghassan Hitto’s exile government, or Salim Idriss’s General Staff, which is the latest incarnation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

Some individual SIF member factions do collaborate with these groups, such as the Haqq Brigade of Homs, which holds a position on the FSA leadership. But the central SIF leadership does not. It tends to describe the FSA leaders as inconsequential on the ground at best, and tools of the West at worst. While the SIF has promised to cooperate with any and all in the struggle against Bashar al-Assad, it will therefore not become part of the Western-backed alliances. It also makes no bones about its salafi ideology, and does not try to court international support by promising moderate Islam and democracy, like most of the SILF members.

On the other hand, the SIF has also cautiously distanced itself from Jabhat al-Nosra and its Islamic State of Iraq/al-Qaida mother group. It seems to want to portray itself as the responsible adult among Syria’s salafi factions, which will deal with Syria’s problems in a serious manner, and can be counted on to stay clear of militant entanglements outside Syria’s borders. But the SIF leadership also seeks retain good ties to all sides, including the transnational jihadi underground. While it is clearly not an al-Qaida faction, there are personal and ideological connections to radical jihadism, and the SIF leadership publicly lauds Jabhat al-Nosra as good solid Mujahedin.

The recent formalization of Jabhat al-Nosra’s relationship to al-Qaida – which the SIF, unlike the SILF, did not publicly criticize – represents both a risk and an opportunity for the SIF. On the one hand, it does not want to be lumped in with al-Qaida and sanctioned by the international community. On the other hand, it does not want and cannot afford to enter into a conflict with Jabhat al-Nosra. In fact, Jabhat al-Nosra’s pledge of allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri may help the SIF to delineate itself from the most radical wing of the insurgency, and make it come off as more moderate. Despite being very close to Jabhat al-Nosra in purely ideological terms, the SIF leaders will now be able to point out that they’re the non-Qaida wing of Syria’s salafi movement.

SIF mergers and acquisitions

The SIF was originally formed by eleven different groups, in December 2012:

- Ahrar al-Sham Battalions (present across most of Syria)
- Haqq Brigade of Homs
- Ansar al-Sham Battalions of northern Latakia
- Tawhid Army of Deir al-Zor
- Islamic Vanguard Group of Binnish, Idleb
- Islamic Dawn Movement of Aleppo
- Fighting Faith Battalions of Damascus
- Moussaab bin Omeir Battalion of Maskana, Aleppo
- Hamza bin Abdelmuttaleb Battalion of Zabadani, Damascus region
- Suqour al-Islam Battalions of the Damascus region
- Special Assignments Companies of the Damascus region

Since then, several of these groups have merged around the core Ahrar al-Sham faction, solidifying the alliance step by step. A first set of mergers were announced in January 2013, and followed by a second wave in March-April.

The resulting Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement is by far the largest and most influential member group of the SIF, and one of the largest rebel factions in Syria. Its forerunner, the Ahrar al-Sham Battalions, was the driving force behind the SIF’s creation. Most of the SIF leadership is drawn from this original Ahrar al-Sham group, including the SIF’s spokesperson Abu Abderrahman al-Souri and its chairman, Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi.

Of the SIF’s eleven original founding organizations, the following seven have by now folded into the expanded Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement:

- Ahrar al-Sham Battalions
- Islamic Vanguard Group
- Islamic Dawn Movement
- Fighting Faith Battalions
- Moussaab bin Omeir Battalion
- Hamza bin Abdelmuttaleb Battalion
- Suqour al-Islam Battalions
- Special Assignments Companies

By early May 2013, the SIF’s updated member roster therefore looks as follows:

- Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement (national)
- Haqq Brigade (Homs)
- Ansar al-Sham Battalions (Latakia)
- Tawhid Army (Deir al-Zor)
- Haqq Battalions (Hama) – the new addition

Clearly, the internal consolidation of the SIF is proceding at an impressive speed, but external growth had been nonexistent – until a couple of weeks ago.

The Haqq Battalions Gathering

In April, the Haqq Battalions Gathering (Tajammou Kataeb al-Haqq) joined the SIF as its first new member since December 2012. The Haqq Battalions Gathering is an Islamist group centered on Tayybet al-Imam, a town north of Hama City which straddles the Damascus-Aleppo highway.

The group was apparently founded by one Nabhan Ahmed al-Mustafa (later killed in the summer of 2012). It has been working with Ahrar al-Sham and other groups in the region. While it is clearly an Islamist group, it formerly acted under the FSA name (as did several other SIF factions). Rival groups in Hama have accused the Haqq Battalions of being supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, but I have no idea whether that’s true. They claim to have executed at least one suicide bombing, which is interesting. Despite their religious radicalism, suicide bombings are almost unheard of among the SIF factions, although Ahrar al-Sham possibly pulled one or two off earlier in the uprising. Instead, virtually all suicide bombings in Syria have so far been performed by Jahbat al-Nosra and its salafi-jihadi allies.

Like several other SIF factions, the Haqq Battalions have at one point hosted the eccentric London-based salafi-jihadi figure, Sheikh Abu Basir al-Tartousi. This salafi-jihadi ideologue spent much of 2012 traveling in rebel-held Syria, while publicly feuding with other jihadis who were upset about his criticism of Jabhat al-Nosra and other al-Qaida factions (interestingly, he’s also notable for his opposition to suicide bombings). Both the SIF and Abu Basir himself deny that there is any form of organized relationship between them, but they clearly benefit from each other, and it’s interesting that everything that Abu Basir touches seems to turn into an SIF faction.

The significance of the SIF’s expansion

The recent addition of the Haqq Battalions must be a welcome event for the SIF’s leaders. Not so much because the Haqq Battalions are a major force on the ground – they’re not – but because it shows that the SIF can attract and does accept new members.

Resistance factions have been consolidating into larger blocs since many months, driven both by political and financial factors. The creation of the Salim Idriss version of the FSA, the stepped-up GCC and US support for this group, and the Jabhat al-Nosra/al-Qaida announcement, have all raised the stakes and are forcing other factions to take a stand. In this game of musical chairs, the SIF’s own cohesion will be threatened, but there’s no telling which way things will break.

If the SIF can stick together for the long term, or even manages draw fighters out of the SILF/FSA, it will be too big and radical a chunk to swallow for the FSA, and yet also too big to safely ignore, isolate, or attack. This bears watching.

— Aron Lund

Is Syria Like Iraq?
By Joshua Landis, May 1, 2012, Syria Comment

In my recent discussion with Murhaf Jouejati on PBS Newshour, I argued that the reason the US should avoid taking the lead in Syria is that the conflict is sectarian and resembles that of Iraq, where the US had little success.

Murhaf took issue with my analysis arguing that Syria is not like Iraq. He said that Iraq was invaded and Syria was not. He also argued that violence in Syria stems from a popular uprising not civil war.

I disagree. Syria is like Iraq. It presents a potential quagmire for the US should Washington intervene under the assumption that the killing will stop once the Assad regime is destroyed. A humanitarian intervention will become a nation-building project, as was the case in Iraq.

Syria is much like Iraq in that minorities (20%) have for 40 years held their foot on the neck of the majority, which is now fighting a war to take control of the country. In both countries, the political struggle falls largely along religious and ethnic lines, although, both class and regional differences are also important.

Syria’s revolt started as a peaceful struggle, but took on a sectarian character as the government used violence. Sectarianism has long been a seminal part of politics in Syria. The regime has protected itself by using sectarian strategies and has mobilized and exploited historic Alawite fear of Sunni discrimination and mistreatment.

Like its neighbors, Syria suffers from sectarian divisions. The most recent PEW poll demonstrates that 91% of Lebanese Shia have a favorable view of Assad while 92% of Lebanese Sunnis have an unfavorable view of him. These Lebanese percentages probably reflect the Syrian sectarian divide as well.

In Iraq, the Sunni minority of 20% dominated the Shiite majority of 60% through the Baath Party. In Syria, the Shiite minority, supported by other religious minorities, making up 20% of the population have dominated the Sunni Arab majority of 70% through the Baath Party. In both countries the security state was controlled by the religious minority. Both countries also share a significant Kurdish minority which wants its national rights recognized and resents historic domination and discrimination by Arabs.

Of course there are differences between Syria and Iraq, but the fact remains that both have descended into sectarian and ethnic violence. Syria’s violence will not end when the state or brutal regime is destroyed. In Iraq, sectarian and ethnic violence exploded, as did general chaos and criminality, following the destruction of Saddam’s brutal state. In Syria, something similar has already begun to happen. The liberated regions are beset by chaos and criminality. Warlordism is taking root. Foreign intervention cannot solve this problem. The Syrian opposition has had over two years to unify, but has not. Fragmentation is rife, and militias abound.

Syria has not developed a national identity that can bind its people together around a common idea or ideology. This is why the US cannot nation-build. To the extent that the opposition militias have found an ideology to mobilize the Sunni Arab population, it is political Islam, not secular nationalism. If the US takes the lead in Syria, it will insist on promoting secularism and going to war against many of the Salafist groups which inspire great devotion from their followers and supply the revolution with its best fighting forces. Syrian moderates should not want the US pushing them into war against fundamentalist Sunnis. Syrians need to find a solution to their own ideological struggles, which is not violent or driven by foreign interests. The US does not understand Muslim or Syrian sensibilities. The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist groups will play a big role in Syria’s future. Having the US try to push them aside in favor of the small group of secular “moderates” is bad politics that will prolong instability in Syria, not shorten it.

Considering that the US engagement in Iraq cost well over 1 trillion dollars and political violence remains high, the US intervention was not a success. Washington solved little. 400 Iraqis were killed in bombings and attacks this April alone. The US did not bring power-sharing, justice, or an end to political killing in Iraq, thus failing in its mission. Iraqi Arabs do not like us today. Both on a humanitarian level and in terms of national interest, the intervention failed. The Iraqi government is working against US interests on almost every front. How will the US be more successful in Syria, where the problems are so similar?

The US should not lead the way in Syria. Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have a much greater stake in Syria and should lead the way. Their interest will be sustained. They have the money, advanced weapons, and strong religious motivation to help the rebels and defeat Iranian and Shiite influence in Syria. The US should not be taking sides in the larger regional contest pitting Shiites against Sunnis.

I am sure the US can help, but to take the lead as we did in Iraq and Afghanistan would be the height of folly. The US should definitely spend much more money to aid Syrians, but others should take the lead in using military force and in helping Syria build a new state and common sense of national identity.

News Round Up

Why the US Should Not Intervene in Syria
Published on Thursday, May 2, 2013 by Informed Comment
by Juan Cole

After President Obama’s remarks about chemical weapons use in Syria, many newspaper articles appeared suggesting that he was rethinking his opposition to US involvement there. They were wrong, and weren’t listening. Obama said we don’t know who used the chemical weapons or to what extent. That isn’t building a case for intervention, it is knocking it down.

Olivier Knox gets this story right, in part because he asked experienced Washington, D.C. insiders.

Obama learned from Iraq and Afghanistan that US military intervention in the Middle East doesn’t actually work very well. Iraq is still a security basket case, with over 400 dead in bombings and attacks in April (nowhere near the high of 3000 a month in 2006 when the US was in charge of security, or even as much as contemporary Mexico, where over 1,000 a month have been dying in the drug war — but still no paradise). It has been 11 years and we are still stuck in Afghanistan, nor have we “stood up” a credible Afghan government.

Why people think a US intervention in Syria would go better, I don’t know. They always forget that generals are about winning quickly, even at the cost of civilian lives, and that a lot of carpetbaggers always show up in any war to find ways of profiting from it. Billions were looted from Iraq by American bureaucrat-criminals.

Sen. John McCain argues for an aerial intervention, which more or less worked in Libya. But Syria is not like Libya in any way.

Syria’s weapons depots, tanks and artillery are not out in some desert where they can be bombed with few casualties. They are in the cities. Bombing them would kill a lot of innocent civilians. Even just trying to take out the large number of anti-aircraft batteries (the essential first step of any aerial intervention) would be very costly in lives.

Everyone always forgets that if foreigners bomb a hated regime’s installations and accidentally thereby kill large numbers of innocent civilians, the dead civilians show up on the front page and everyone turns against the foreign air force. NATO only avoided this outcome in Libya by staying mostly away from the cities (it did not actually intervene in the Misrata siege). The few bombing raids on Gaddafi’s HQ, the Bab al-Aziziyah, did give the regime some propaganda points, since you can’t bomb downtown Tripoli without casualties.

So an air intervention is impractical in Syria, because its geography and the distribution of weapons are just different from those in Libya. And, any air intervention could well become unpopular both in Syria and the world, really, really fast.

A limited and very careful air intervention could possibly do some good, but in my experience military enterprises cannot be conducted in a ‘limited’ or ‘careful’ way.

If the concern is chemical weapons, those cannot be dealt with (must not be dealt with) by bombing them. That step would just release them into the air and kill people. Since McCain and other interventionists are not proposing US troops on the ground, it is unclear how he thinks the chemical weapons can be secured.

Moreover, the simple fact is that the US does not have good intel on where the chemical weapons are stockpiled. In the absence of really good such information, aerial bombardment of military bases risks accidentally hitting the canisters and releasing clouds of toxic gases onto civilian populations.

If an aerial intervention is not practicable, what about arming the rebels? The latter are already armed, so what this proposal really entails is giving them medium and heavy weaponry. But there is no way to keep such weapons out of the hands of radicals within the rebel camp. Moreover, having a lot of medium to heavy weaponry flood into a country can destabilize it for decades. If the Syrian rebels got shoulder-held heat-seeking missiles, would the Israeli civilian airlines, El Al, ever be safe again, in the aftermath?

I was in Pakistan in the early 1980s when security was relatively good. Then the CIA flooded in weapons to help the Mujahidin fight the Soviet-backed leftist government in Afghanistan. These weapons got sold on a Pakistani black market and started showing up in the bazaar. I had been in Lebanon’s civil war before going to Pakistan, and knew what it means when civilians can buy automatic guns at will. Pakistan’s security has spiraled down ever since and it is unclear when the world’s sixth-largest country will recover from the plague of weapons that has afflicted it.

So sending a lot of weapons into Syria might end the war sooner (or might not; the regime has heavier weapons); but it could also prolong the violence and insecurity in the aftermath.

People talk about arming groups loyal to the West, but that was how al-Qaeda got started in the first place. They don’t necessarily maintain an alliance of convenience with the foreigners.

All this is not to reckon with Russian and Chinese opposition to NATO intervention, and the consequent lack of a security council resolution. For the US to act in the teeth of international law would just be one more nail in its coffin. Sometimes if you aren’t careful, you undermine the very framework you are trying to uphold.

Finding ways to help the refugees and displaced, and to get food to half-starving neighborhoods in places like Homs, are about the best the US could do. I think we’re on the verge of having a plausible humanitarian corridor in the north, and Jordan is considering a buffer zone in the south.

It is not as if the world is stepping up on humanitarian aid in the first place; why would anybody think they will risk even more with a military role? Lets see billions in humanitarian aid flow to the Syrian people– that might sustain them for their fight against tyranny. But even that is not being done.

It is a horrible situation. It breaks our hearts every day. But here as in medicine, the first rule has to be to do no harm, to avoid making things worse. It would be very, very easy to make things worse.

Obama is a smart man who knows all the above. That is why he is reluctant to get involved in that civil war, unless it spills over onto a US ally in the region in a highly destabilizing way.

Brzezinski’s view on Syria. Video “The US should not be a protagonist…. This is a sectarian war.”

Jon Stewart on Syria and GOP Hawks

Daniel C. Kurtzer, in NYTimes – a former United States ambassador to Egypt and to Israel

Constructing an international coalition of willing states — especially Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar — is the only strategically wise option for the United States. Without such a coalition, intervention won’t work. And without such a coalition, America must reject unilateral military intervention in Syria.

Town of Masreb

FSA Militias

Fractured Syrian rebels scour for cash as funders dry up
By Abigail Fielding-Smith in Gaziantep

When the Syrian uprising was in its early stages in 2011, one businessman decided to do what he could to help. Banding together with other wealthy individuals from his town, some of them based overseas, he helped a group of local fighters buy light weapons “to continue the revolution”.

After burning through tens of thousands of dollars of his own money, he was eventually forced to give up sponsoring the group towards the end of last year. His own finances were being exhausted, while the needs of his recipients had grown. “When we began there were 50-60 people, now there are 5,000 fighters,” he says. “What can we do?”

Financing from networks of well-off individuals like him, once the lifeblood of the Syrian rebellion, is starting to dry up as the conflict escalates, increasing its dependency on state-sponsored support networks. Driven into an increasingly frantic search for support, some smaller groups have formed alliances and affiliations – often short lived – with those with more secure funding.

When the revolt against Bashar al-Assad took on an armed dimension in the second half of 2011, it was a highly localised affair involving small units defending their communities with light weapons. The fact that each aspiring commander could turn to networks of expatriate businessmen for funding helped create a rebellion fractured in to little fiefdoms.

“The way the rebellion started contained the ingredients for fragmentation, and financing was a key factor,” says Emile Hokayem of the International Institute for Strategic Studies think-tank.

Syria uprising

The brutal response by the regime of Bashar al-Assad to the popular revolt is exposing failures in international policy

But by late last year the rebels’ needs had changed. They had progressed from smaller operations that required light weapons and instead were launching offensive assaults on helicopter bases. Qatar and Saudi Arabia had meanwhile started to supply weapons. Supporting the Syrian rebellion became a big players’ game.

“It’s very expensive,” explains another individual donor, who says he too has had to cut off support for the rebels, even though he believes it is a “duty”.

Chuck Hagel, US defence secretary, said on Thursday that the US was considering providing weapons to rebel groups fighting the regime. However, he said that President Barack Obama had not yet made a decision.

Financial exhaustion is not the only reason support from individual donors has fallen. A fighter from the northern province of Idlib dates the decline in his group’s support from individual sponsors in the Gulf and elsewhere to the US’s designation in December of the extremist rebel group Jabhat al Nusra as a terrorist organisation. The idea of even accidentally helping fighters affiliated with the group was too risky for some businessmen.

Smaller groups feel the reduced contributions from individual businessmen most. The mounting pressure on them can be seen in the funding and logistics hubs of southern Turkey, where the word da’ameen – support – peppers every conversation. “They’re always telling us to wait,” grumbles one middle-aged fighter after getting off the phone from a potential supporter.

In theory, this should result in greater consolidation of rebel groups as smaller units cluster around those who have access to resources, either from captured booty, still active fundraising networks, or through the Saudi and Qatari-backed supreme military council.

The trend since the second half of last year has been towards the formation of larger alliances, said Aron Lund, a Swedish researcher.

“Right now they are with one brigade, next another. They are following the money”

But alliances and affiliations are often tenuous. Support to the rebellion is still given on a less than systematic basis. For smaller groups, the possibility of a new source of sponsorship is always just around the corner, mitigating against cohesion.

“A few battalions have several names – they have promised this or that funder they’ll be loyal to him, and then get money from somewhere else,” says Emile Hokayem.

The supreme military council itself does not seem to be getting enough support to bind people to it. In a recent interview with the Financial Times, the body’s leader, General Selim Idriss, estimated that he was receiving just one-tenth of the rebellion’s needs, citing lack of ammunition as the reason for recent defeat in the siege of the Wadi Deif military base in Idlib.

“We are with them, but not with them,” says one fighter from a small unit in Latakia describing his group’s relationship with the supreme military council. “We take from here and there.”

The businessman certainly doesn’t see any evidence of commitment among his former beneficiaries. “Right now they are with one brigade, next another,” he says. “They are following the money.”

For Some Syrian Rebels, It’s a Battle of the Brands –  WSJ

Syrian Rebels Accused Of Terrorizing Population As Kidnappings, Torture Are Rampant, Huffington Post  |  By Michel Stors

“The Free Syrian Army has fallen prey to gangsters & fanatic thugs!” – Spectator

“… On my last trip into Syria, I met Ayat, a female activist who had worked in a Damascus bank before she turned to running guns for the revolution. In tight black jeans and sneakers, she still looked like the girl-about-town she had once been. She refused to cover up in a hijab and would not leave the room when the men arrived, however much the fighters hissed at her and told her (literally) to get back to the kitchen. Ayat was in despair about the FSA’s inability to take the capital. ‘Each group is just sitting on its weapons trying to grab what they can for themselves,’ she said. Things are getting so bad, there are even reports of rebel fighters defecting back to the government side, disgusted with the way the armed uprising has betrayed its ideals…”

Regime Brutality

Sky News (GB): ‘Massacre By Syrian Forces Kills At Least 50′
2013-05-02

Forces loyal to Syria’s leader have stormed a village in a “massacre” that has left at least 50 people dead, reports say. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said President Bashar al Assad’s troops and militias raided the coastal village of al-Baida, Syrian opposition activists say…

Obama Policy

Obama moving toward sending lethal arms to Syrian rebels, officials say
By Karen DeYoung, Published: April 30

President Obama is preparing to send lethal weaponry to the Syrian opposition and has taken steps to assert more aggressive U.S. leadership among allies and partners seeking the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad, according to senior administration officials.

The officials said they are moving toward the shipment of arms but emphasized that they are still pursuing political negotiation. To that end, the administration has launched an effort to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin that the probable use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government — and the more direct outside intervention that could provoke — should lead him to reconsider his support of Assad….

GOP Rep Justifies U.S. Military Intervention In Syria: ‘So Much Of Christianity Is There
By Ben Armbruster on May 1, 2013 at 12:05 pm

Darrell Issa (Credit: Bloomberg)
A Republican congressman said last week that any potential U.S. military intervention in the Syrian civil war would be justified, in part, to protect Syria’s Christian population and preserve the region’s Christian roots.

According to Defense News, Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA) told reporters after a classified briefing on Syria that he favors military intervention in Syria “to preserve the region that was home to Christianity’s genesis”: “

“There’s a huge US interest in the region. Our commitment to the Levante is long-standing, partially because of our relationship with Israel and with Lebanon,” Issa told a handful of reporters after leaving a classified briefing on the Syria intel assessment and possible US options.

“Partially, if you will, because of this being an area of the Holy Land,” Issa added. “The oldest churches. So much of Christianity is there.”

Economy

Syrian Pound has fallen to 150 to the dollar from its starting point of 47 in 2011.

Syrian investors flock to Damascus bourse to protect savings.
May 1 2013 (CPI Financial) –

Syrian investor Khaleel Tohmeh is on a buying spree in the Damascus stock market, pinning his hopes on a long-term recovery of a bourse that has seen about two-thirds of its capitalisation wiped out by the two-year-old civil war.

“I am finding shares very attractive at these levels and cannot find another place to put my money, even if it will be two years before I can benefit,” said Tohmeh, speaking by telephone from his Damascus office. “Whatever the timing, the market will rise much faster than it fell.”

For the last few weeks, the stock market, with a capitalisation of about $1 billion at the Syrian pound’s beaten-down exchange rate, has boomed.

Polls about Public Opinion and Syria

No Love for Assad, Yet No Support for Arming the Rebels
Pew Research

• Obama Bets Big on Syrian Rebel Leader By David Ignatius | The Washington Post
• Syria’s Hijacked Struggle By Ribal al-Assad | Today’s Zaman
• Waste Not, Strike Iran Not By Uri Misgav | Haaretz
• Time to Act in Syria By Bob Casey | Huffington Post
• Lebanon Border Region Caught in Syria Conflict By Ned Parker and Nabih Bulos | Los Angles Times

 Iran Counters Saudi Diplomacy In Lebanon -  Jean Aziz for Al-Monitor Lebanon Pulse

Al-Hayat (Pan Arab) – Opposition Leader Describes Obstacles to US-Russia Deal on Syria

Is Egypt Moving Closer To Iran on Syria? – Al-Monitor

Mohamed Said Idris, a former parliamentarian and an expert on Iranian affairs, said that it is clear that Egypt is moving to adopt a different position from those of Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia on how to resolve the Syrian crisis. He added, “Egypt’s vision is based on the rejection of any foreign military action to oust the regime in Damascus.”..

It should be noted that Salafists held a demonstration and surrounded the headquarters of the Iranian diplomatic mission in Cairo to reject the arrival of Iranian tourists under the pretext of preventing the “spread of Shiism” in Egypt. According to the Egyptian Tourism Ministry, the demonstration caused the “temporary” suspension of flights between the two countries.

Nafi’a said, “Egypt should prepare itself to stand up to the US, Israel and the GCC as it re-establishes its relations with Iran. … This requires a wide-ranging vision for Egypt’s regional role and its relations around the world. But that vision, unfortunately, does not exist.”

A number of diplomats are worried about Egypt’s relations with the Gulf states. Egyptian diplomatic sources said, “We have millions of Egyptians working in the Gulf countries. They represent a fourth of our budget revenues. Will Iran compensate us, at least partially, if that revenue is lost?”….

Petition

A group of Syrian, Arab, and international activists launched “The Campaign of Global Solidarity with the Syrian Revolution” at the World Social Forum in Tunis last month. Sign it.

This hour, On Point: NPR – the U.S. and the red line. Should the US intervene?
Guests

• Anne Barnard, Middle East reporter for the New York Times. (@abarnardnyt)
• Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma. Blogs at “Syria Comment.” (@joshua_landis)
• Shadi Hamid, director of research at the Brookings Doha Center and a fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. (@shadihamid)

Watch U.S. Must Weigh Risks of Involvement in Syria on PBS with Murhaf Jouejati and Joshua Landis. See more from PBS NewsHour.

Hi Joshua:  As someone who grew up in Oklahoma City but left in 1952 after high school it’s refreshing to occasionally hear a voice of reason from that state. …Your comments on the News Hour were refreshing.  Some day perhaps we’ll quit thinking we can control what goes on all over the world.  Chris Brauchli

U.S. Analysis of Syria’s Russian-Made Air Defenses
Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2013, —Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes

WASHINGTON—Lawmakers pressed the Obama administration to intervene in Syria’s civil war, citing the regime’s alleged chemical-weapons use, as the White House weighed its response against a sobering fact: Damascus has developed a world class air-defense system.
That system, built, installed and maintained—largely in secret—by Russia’s military complex, presents a formidable deterrent as the White House draws up options for responding to a U.S. intelligence report released last week concluding that Damascus likely used chemical weapons on the battlefield.

Leading Democratic and Republican lawmakers on Sunday said they didn’t believe the U.S. should send American troops into Syria. They and the Obama administration are wary about U.S. involvement in another Middle East conflict after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But some called for a no-fly zone and more humanitarian aid.

Previously undisclosed details about Syria’s antiaircraft systems outline the evolution of one of the most advanced and concentrated barriers on the planet, developed to ward off U.S. and Israeli warplanes, say U.S. intelligence and defense officials. The Obama administration only sporadically intervened to try to stop its construction, the officials say.

In White House meetings about military options for Syria, Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, frequently singles out Mr. Assad’s air-defense prowess as the single biggest obstacle to U.S. intervention, according to current and former officials who participated in the briefings.

Advocates of military action believe the threat posed by Syria’s defenses is overstated by the Obama administration, in part to justify not taking action. Some have cited Israel’s successful bombing in January that targeted a suspected SA-17 antiaircraft missile shipment.
However, as Pentagon officials later learned, the Israeli planes never entered Syrian airspace.

Instead, the Israeli warplanes were flying over Lebanon when they executed what is called a “lofting” maneuver—using a sudden burst of speed and altitude to catapult a bomb across the border to the target about 10 miles inside Syria, according to a previously undisclosed U.S. account of the Israeli operation

.Israeli officials said the decision was made to bomb from nd tracked many of the upgraded systems during a period of rapid modernization after a 2007 Israeli airstrike on a suspected Syrian nuclear site. But the Americans rarely interfered, viewing Iran as the region’s larger threat and, under the Obama administration, initially pursuing improved ties with both Russia and Syria.

Obama administration officials say they raised their concerns with Moscow in their meetings even if they knew Russia was unlikely to respond.

Now, with evidence mounting that the Syrian regime has used at least small amounts of chemical weapons against opponents of President Bashar al-Assad, the consequences of policy choices from a prior decade may limit the ability of the U.S. and its allies to respond today.
President Barack Obama has sethe relative safety of Lebanese airspace for diplomatic as well as security reasons. The Israeli Embassy in Washington declined to comment.

Gen. Dempsey has told the White House that stealth aircraft and ship-based, precision-guided missiles could destroy many Syrian air-defense sites relatively quickly. But he has warned policy makers that mobile launchers would be harder to find and destroy and that their location among population centers likely would mean civilian casualties.

Officials believe any operation would also be costly and dangerous to U.S. personnel.

On Sunday, Sen. John McCain (R., Ariz.), a sharp critic of Mr. Obama’s Syria policy, didn’t discuss those risks in arguing that the U.S. should support a no-fly zone with unmanned aircraft to protect civilians and rebels. Other lawmakers called for more humanitarian aid. “We can get in and out. That’s not the issue,” said a senior U.S. official. “The issue is can you take out the entire air defense system and keep it down. That’s just completely a different kettle of fish.”

U.S. officials were aware of Russia’s involvement a

t the use of chemical weapons as a “red line” that could trigger U.S. military involvement. Reluctant to intervene, however, the White House has called for a deeper international investigation into evidence pointing to the likelihood that Syrian forces have gassed their opponents.

“We knew the Syrians were bolstering their air defense systems. We saw this as a Syrian effort to deter Israeli incursions,” said one of the senior U.S. officials who helped oversee those efforts during Mr. Obama’s first term. “But we [the U.S.] would pay attention to it sporadically. We had to pick and choose. The main focus was Iran.”

U.S. officials believe Russia’s goal in helping Mr. Assad was to deter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from intervening in Syria as the alliance did in Libya in 2011 and in Serbia in 1998, operations Moscow opposed.

U.S. officials believe Russian technicians are on hand with many of the Syrian air-defense units, providing technical assistance. The Russians, many employees of Russian defense contractors, repair broken equipment with components imported from Russia, the officials said.

Officials at the Russian embassy in Washington said they don’t discuss military and technical cooperation with other countries. But Moscow has denied any special relationship with Mr. Assad, arguing that Russia is supporting the principle of nonintervention.
The first air-defense deals between Russia and Syria date back decades. But Russia in recent years has stepped up shipments to modernize Syria’s targeting systems and make the air defenses mobile, and therefore much more difficult for Israel—and the U.S.—to overcome.

The U.S. detected Mr. Assad was seeking major air defense expansions after a series of foreign incursions, including the 2007 Israeli bombing of a suspected nuclear site at al Kibar; the February 2008 assassination in Damascus of Imad Mugniyah, a high-ranking Hezbollah military commander; and a September 2008 car bombing that U.S. officials say targeted a Syrian military intelligence facility.
Embarrassed by Israel’s ease of access to his country, Mr. Assad plunged into an effort to procure batteries of Russian interceptors and early warning systems. He arrayed them in overlapping concentric circles in and around population centers.

According to an internal U.S. intelligence assessment, in August 2008, Russia began shipping SA-22 Pantsir-S1 units to Syria. The system, a combination surface-to-air missile and 30 mm antiaircraft gun, has a digital targeting system and is mounted on a combat vehicle, making it easy to move. Today, Syria has 36 of the vehicles, according to the U.S. assessment.

In 2009, the Russians started upgrading Syria’s outdated analog SA-3 surface-to-air missile systems, turning them into the SA-26 Pechora-2M system, which is mobile and digital, equipped with missiles with an operational range of 17 miles.

The U.S. is particularly worried about another modernized system provided by Moscow—the SA-5. With an operational range of 175 miles, SA-5 missiles could take out U.S. planes flying from Cyprus, a key NATO base that was used during Libya operations and would likely be vital in any Syrian operation.

Since March 2011, when the rebellion against Mr. Assad started, Russia has continued to support the air-defense system, providing key components and replacement parts, and sending technicians to test it, U.S. officials say.
Officials suspect one of the Pechoras shot down a Turkish reconnaissance plane last June, an incident closely studied by the U.S. and cited as evidence the system hasn’t been degraded by the conflict.

Last November, U.S. intelligence agencies learned that a flight from Russia to Syria was carrying components for the SA-17 Grizzly antiaircraft system, according to U.S. officials, who say resupply flights continue.

The Pentagon decided it could do little to stop the shipments, reflecting Washington’s shifting views of Damascus and a lack of U.S. influence with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

“A major focus has been on offensive weapons, not defensive,” a senior Obama administration said of the U.S.’s approach under Mr. Obama toward arms transfers to Syria.

Defense officials worried that raising U.S.-Russian tensions over Syria could prompt Moscow to retaliate by making it harder for the U.S. to use needed air and ground routes though Russian territory to withdraw military supplies from Afghanistan.

Pentagon officials concluded it wasn’t realistic to try to block all sales of air-defense systems. Instead, they decided to target what officials called “game changers”—the systems that most threaten Israel and the U.S.

U.S. doubts on Syria lie in how sarin exposure occurred
By Paul Richter, Ken Dilanian and David S. Cloud, Los Angeles Times

Intelligence agencies are confident the poison gas was released but are less sure about whether Bashar Assad’s regime is responsible or even whether it was deliberate.

After weeks of skepticism about reports that chemical weapons had been used, the Obama administration announced Thursday that the agencies making up the intelligence community had concluded “with varying degrees of confidence” that the Syrian regime had used sarin on a “small scale.”

Before deciding on a response, the administration said, it wants definitive proof that the regime used the poison gas. It said it would work with the United Nations and allies such as France and Britain to find the answer.

Analysis: No good military options for U.S. in Syria
By Phil Stewart and Peter Apps,| Sat Apr 27, 2013

(Reuters) – Despite President Barack Obama’s pledge that Syria’s use of chemical weapons is a “game changer” for the United States, he is unlikely to turn to military options quickly and would want allies joining him in any intervention.

Possible military choices range from limited one-off missile strikes from ships – one of the less complicated scenarios – to bolder operations like carving out no-fly safe zones.

One of the most politically unpalatable possibilities envisions sending tens of thousands of U.S. forces to help secure Syrian chemical weapons…

“There’s a lot of analysis to be done before reaching any major decisions that would push U.S. policy more in the direction of military options,” a senior U.S. official told Reuters.

That caution is understandable, given the experience of Iraq ….

STRIKES, NO-FLY ZONE

One form of military intervention that could to some extent limit U.S. and allied involvement in Syria’s war would be one-off strikes on pro-Assad forces or infrastructure tied to chemical weapons use. Given Syria’s air defenses, planners may choose to fire missiles from ships at sea.

“The most proportional response (to limited chemical weapons use) would be a strike on the units responsible, whether artillery or airfields,” said Jeffrey White,…

Another option that the Pentagon has examined involves the creation, ostensibly in support of Turkey and Jordan, of humanitarian safe areas that would also be no-fly zones off limits to the Syrian air force – an option favored by lawmakers including Senator John McCain of Arizona.

This would involve taking down Syrian air defenses and destroying Syrian artillery from a certain distance beyond those zones, to protect them from incoming fire.

Advocates, including in Congress, say a safe zone inside Syria along the Turkish border, for example, would give needed space for rebels and allow the West to increase support for those anti-Assad forces it can vet.

Still, as officials, including Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, have warned, once established, a safe zone would tie the United States more closely to Syria’s messy conflict. Assad would almost certainly react.

“Once you set up a military no-fly zone or safe zone, you’re on a slippery slope, mission creep and before you know it, you have boots on the ground,” said Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst and Middle East expert at the Brookings Institution.

“Or you end up like Libya where you don’t really have a control mechanism for the end-game, should you end up with chaos.”

…. leaving weapons sites vulnerable to pillaging. The U.S. fears anti-Assad Islamist rebels affiliated to al Qaeda could grab the chemical weapons but a U.S. intervention into Syria to get the arms would require tens of thousands of American troops.

Asked if he was confident the U.S. military could secure Syria’s chemical weapons stock, Dempsey told Congress: “Not as I sit here today simply because they have been moving it and the number of sites is quite numerous.”…

The Economics of Civil War in Syria
Faysal Itani | April 18, 2013 – Atlantic Council

Without foreign military intervention or a substantial boost in military support for the rebels, the civil war in Syria will probably destroy its state and economy. This has spurred much discussion in policy circles about Syria’s postwar reconstruction and economic recovery, which could cost an estimated $80 billion. Much of it has rightly focused on reestablishing and strengthening trade, investment, and monetary stability. But focusing solely on key sectors and best practices of development neglects the role of wartime elites in postwar economies. Postwar reconstruction efforts that do not account for the economic logic of civil war and the interest groups it creates may well fail, and even lead to a resumption of fighting. Policymakers involved in building a new Syrian economy will therefore face fiendishly difficult choices.

Civil wars present unique challenges to rebuilding efforts, due to the destruction they inflict on state institutions and a country’s social fabric. Syria has already seen two years of fighting, and there is no indication of an end to the war. The collapse of government authority and services in much of the country has led to a proliferation of militias and the emergence of a war economy led by new elites. In addition to the current problems of inflation, soaring unemployment, a shortage of basic goods, and a weakening currency and financial system, economic reconstruction efforts will have to contend with troubling new realities: a vast informal economy and black market; the rise of militia leaders as business actors, rent-seekers and patronage distributors; unemployed fighters who will need to demobilize and rejoin civilian life; and rising sectarianism coloring many aspects of economic, political, and social life.

Lebanon faced many of the same challenges following the end of its own civil war (1975-1990). Fifteen years of fighting had essentially destroyed the state by the time a peace accord was signed, leading to near-total economic collapse. Significantly, the war began as a conflict between two broad political factions but, as in Syria, within a few years the number of factions and front lines multiplied exponentially. Rival militias carved out their geographic and economic spheres of influence, and many of their leaders grew exceedingly wealthy. Civil war took on an economic logic of its own.

Lebanon’s war was not fought over economic issues, but the deepening parochialism of the conflict and focus on war as a money-making enterprise certainly complicated peace efforts and postwar development. Something similar appears to be happening within the Syrian rebellion, with reports of looting by fighters. Some rebels treat private property in captured territory as spoils of war, and a mentality of plunder is taking root among militias (jihadist groups are reportedly more disciplined, but constitute a fraction of total fighters and, in any case, are not likely to play a significant role in post conflict development). Lebanon witnessed the same wartime phenomenon, and was only able to end its civil war and begin to recover economically by granting rival militia leaders a major stake in the postwar economy. This was seen as the only way to commit the civil war elites to peace and demobilization, and led to the emergence of postwar business elites closely connected to and sometimes overlapping with the political elite.

Syria’s dominance of postwar Lebanon allowed it to act as an arbiter and distributor of economic largesse to rival factions. Thus far, no one foreign actor appears ready to assume responsibility for postwar Syria. On the contrary, local militant groups fighting the same enemy (the regime) are backed by rival foreign powers, and increasingly fear and distrust one another. The absence of an overlord of sorts may complicate efforts to enforce a division of public services, jobs, and resources among militia members and supporters, and hinder economic recovery in general.

In addition to the rise of new elites from the ranks of militias, there is likely to be some continuity between pre and postwar power groups in Syria. This applies to the Sunni business class, which has been slow to turn against a regime that historically protected its commercial interests. Less obviously, it also applies to the Alawite elite: some analysts predict that a rebel victory would trigger an Alawite migration to a sectarian enclave in the northwest, leaving the cities and their lucrative economies to the Sunnis. This is one possibility of course, but not a very likely one. Elites, including or perhaps especially minority elites, seldom cede hard-won power and economic privileges easily. The Alawites share a vivid collective memory of their misery and crushing poverty in pre-Assad Syria. They will probably use any means to ensure they retain a stake in the postwar economy, in which they will almost certainly play some role. Whether this is a spoiler role—perhaps in the form of an insurgency—or a helpful one will depend on the postwar order’s ability to extend state patronage to Alawite groups….

Angry Arab interviews Thomas Pierret on Syria

…The only independent variable you need to understand the resilience of the Syrian regime is the kin-based and sectarian (Alawite) nature of its military. All other purported factors are in fact dependent variables. ….

Sectarianism is a powerful instrument to make sure that you can use the army’s full military might against the population. No military that is reasonably representative of the population could do what the Syrian army did over the last two years, i.e. destroying most of the country’s major cities, including large parts of the capital. You need a sectarian or ethnic divide that separates the core of the military from the target population. Algeria went through a nasty civil war in the 1990s, and Algerian generals are ruthless people, but I do not think that the Algerian military ever used heavy artillery against one of the country’s large cities. The fact that the best units in the Syrian military are largely manned with Alawite soldiers (in addition to members of some loyal Bedouin clans) has been key to explaining the level of violence we have seen over the last two years. Of course, the majority of Syrian soldiers are Sunnis, but it is striking that Asad did only use a minority of the army’s available units: according to some observers, only one third of the army was entrusted with combat missions since the start uprising. Seen from that angle, the purported “cohesion” of the Syrian army becomes much less puzzling: the risk of defections significantly decreases when two-third of the soldiers are in fact locked up in their barracks, or at least kept away from the battlefield.

Syrian Religious Leaders Commit to Establish
the Inter-religious Council of Syria—Religions for Peace
Istanbul, Turkey | 18-20 April 2013

A wide range of Syrian religious leaders convened in Istanbul to advance multi-religious cooperation for peace in Syria during a meeting, Syria for all Syrians. They committed themselves to the establishment of a Syrian Religions for Peace Council (RfP—Syria).
irst: Principles and Visions

A. That all religions renounce violence, corruption and the destruction of humanity and the environment. All religions advocate peace and love. All Syrians deserve to live a free, dignified and virtuous life.

B. Preserving the unity of Syria, land and people, is a national duty.

C. Syria is for all Syrians regardless of their affiliations. Syrians are united in citizenship regardless of their religion, creed, ethnicity, gender and regionalism.

D. Our commitment to moderation compels us to reject all kinds of violations, particularly those instigated by fanaticism and hatred.

E. Syria is a country of diversity. Cultural and civilizational diversity is the source of wealth for all.

F. Emphasize and nurture all commonalities in our religions that call for and nurture peaceful coexistence.

G. Valuating the role of Syrian women and actively calling to cease all forms of aggression and violence against them.

H. We condemn the crimes against the Syrian people, support the UN resolutions condemning this violence and reject all efforts to provoke sectarian violence.

The One-Man Show – By James Traub | Foreign Policy

Secretary of State John Kerry thinks he can singlehandedly solve the world’s most intractable problems. But will President Obama even let him try?

Is the opposition ready to rule?
By Nuha Shabaan and Michael Pizzi

SAS news: As the National Coalition prepares to establish a representative presence in Syrian territories controlled by the Free Syrian Army (FSA), opposition and independent voices alike are expressing doubts about the interim government’s ability to manage the tumultuous security situation, and in particular, guard against the regime’s aerial attacks….

Concerns about the FSA’s ability to protect the interim government were raised over the weekend as regime forces killed hundreds of people in Jdeidat al-Fadl and Artouz in Outer Damascus province. Some activists are beginning to question not only the interim government’s appraisal of the security situation in Syria, but also the strategic competence of the FSA.

“The FSA was very wrong to enter the city of Jdeidat al-Fadl,” says Ayham al-Dimasqhi, a computer engineer who is currently living in Damascus. He believes that the FSA’s apparent presence in these towns provoked the regime to attack and massacre residents, who were defenseless because FSA soldiers had actually retreated prior to the attack. “The FSA cannot protect itself,” al-Dimashqi argues, adding that this does not bode well for its ability to protect an interim government.

Echoing al-Homsi and Farzat, al-Dimashqi cites the regime’s air raids, which he believes to be a consequence of the international community’s indifference toward Syrians, as the FSA’s primary weakness against the Syrian army.

“The reason behind their failure is the air attacks,” al-Dimashqi said…..

Questions over FSA Damascus strategy after govt. operation in southern suburbs leaves hundreds dead

SAS news: Syria’s Local Coordination Councils issued an impassioned statement calling on the FSA to protect civilians Monday after a government assault over the weekend in Jdeidat al-Fadl and Artouz which left up to 566 dead in the southern approaches to the capital.

Syrian rebel coalition leader lobbies U.S. to help overthrow Assad

GHASSAN HITTO: We are certain that this regime has used chemical weapons against the Syrian people. GHASSAN HITTO: What we need from the US is surgical strikes of all the launching pads of Scud missiles. These locations are known to the intelligence community. That’s one. We need the establishment of a no-fly zone. We need safe passages to be established so we can deliver aid to the Syrian people more effectively and more regularly. Holly Williams

Former Mossad head Dagan: Israel should do whatever it can to bring down Syria’s Assad

Removing Assad from power, he added, will be highly beneficial for Israel from a strategic point of view, weakening Hezbollah and Iran in the process. Dagan said that Israel should not be too concerned about the potential animosity a new regime in Damascus, saying that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries will do their utmost to ensure that the successor regime is moderate.

Former IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi told the conference that Israel can attack Iran – and will also be able to withstand the consequences of such an attack. “We cannot allow this regime to have the bomb,” Ashkenazi said.

Obama’s Syria Dilemma
Damned if he does; damned if he doesn’t.
BY AARON DAVID MILLER | APRIL 26, 2013 – FP

….. a red line has indeed been crossed — not only in terms of Syria’s use of chemical weapons, but also in the slippery slide toward American military involvement. What Obama needs to decide is whether such military action is designed to deter the use of chemical weapons or topple the Assad regime by giving the rebels the advantages they’ve long sought — weapons, a no-fly zone, or direct U.S. military strikes against regime targets.

There’s a lot that’s murky about Syria right now, but one thing is clear. For America, a messy situation is about to get a whole lot messier.

Interview with Dr. Sadiq Jalal Al-Azm: The Syrian Revolution and the Role of the Intellectual
Translated by Nader Atassi and Ziad Dallal
January 10th 2013

Doctor Sadiq Jalal al-Azm (born in 1934 in Damascus) is one of the most important Syrian intellectuals of the 20th and 21st centuries…..

The revolution is a Syrian settling of old accounts and an overdue payment of bills that were the result of Syrian silence and cowardice.

The popular Intifada in Syria seeks restoration of the republic through the toppling of the old hereditary regime that is worn-out in all its institutions, and to establish an alternative system of governance

Yes, I fear political Islam, before and after the fall of the regime.

In our culture and society there exists ample elements of authoritarianism, criminality, paternalism and vendetta, that make the reformulation of a despotic regime, in one form or another, a likely and formidable possibility, which calls for extreme caution and utter vigilance.

Syria’s “Wretched of the Earth” are participating in a revolution against a government, a party, and an authoritarian financial-military junta, and against a “nationalist” leadership of divine eternality.

If the revolution brings us somehow to the ballot boxes, then I will be a satisfied citizen.

Among the characteristics of secularism and democracy is that they provide a neutral ground for the meeting of the various religious doctrines and beliefs that are exclusionary by nature, allowing them to interact in the public space, the national arena, and the political landscape.

By Matthew Barber and the Syria Video team

This long post contains the following sections:

• The Defectors Defect
• Will EU Oil Purchases Finance al-Qaida?
• Al-Musareb: Al-Nusra Punishes a Village Regime-Style
• Syrian Taliban
• The Opposition’s Ambivalent Response to al-Nusra’s Affiliation with al-Qaida (and the Plan to Introduce an Alternative Islamic Law in Syria)
• Jabhat al-Nusra is Now an Iraq-to-Lebanon Phenomenon
• Conclusion: Outsiders Reevaluate Their Positions as it Becomes Easier for the Regime to Sell Itself

The Defectors Defect

A Lebanese acquaintance of Dr. Landis wrote in an email about the recent experience of his Syrian natoor (a worker at an apartment building functioning like a cross between a guard, concierge, and janitor):

I’m now in Beirut at my mother’s. The natoor of our building, Riyadh, is from Hassaka. He’s been our natoor for 6 years.

He just got back yesterday from Haasaka after visiting his folks.

On my last trip here in December, he was 100% anti-regime and his two brothers were fighters with FSA. He told me at the time that Assad must go, he is not good for Syria and his cousin Rami ripped off the country. He came to Lebanon after his military service because Assad and his family destroyed Syria.

That was December 2012. He is now 100% pro regime. His two brothers surrendered to the Syrian army and gave up their $500 a month [FSA] salary (he makes here $250/month).

He said the FSA and Nusra are thieves and robbers – much worse than the regime. They quit after seeing how the FSA (their direct commander was an Afghani) was ripping off and selling everything to Turkey. They sold 4 years worth of huntaa [wheat] for 600 SYP a shewal (no idea what a shewal is, but ya3ni) whereas it’s worth 6,000 SYP. They dismantled whole bakeries, small factories, cables, he swore even faucets were ripped out and shipped to Turkey.

His trip from Beirut to Tadmor was relatively safe, he said. But from Tadmor to Hassaka, there is a Nusra roadblock every few kilometers. At each roadblock, heavily armed men, faces completely covered, get up to the bus and shout “Allahu Akbar.” They wait for the passengers to shout back the same while these men lock their eyes trying to figure out if someone is saying Allahu Akbar back according to their standards. He said I know “Ibn baladi” [locals of the area]. None of these thugs are Ibn baladi.

Women, if any, must be completely covered for the roadblock – head to toe like a trash bag. The driver usually tells all women that they must have black burqas with them before they get on the bus.

Anyway, he said “yashodu allah ya ustaz that Bashar is now in our hearts and minds”:

“يشهد اللهً يااستاذ انه بشار الأسد بقلبنا وبدمنا. يشهد الله يااستاذ انه كل أغلاط النظام ويشار وعيلته مغفورة قدام ها لوحوش المجرمين من الجيش الحر والنصرة الله لاينصرهن خربو سورية. يشهد الله يااستاذ انه هللق كل سوري مخلص وشريف وبيحب بلده الآن مع بشار ومع الجيش السوري ضد هل الأوباش.”

He said, we let Bashar down (نحنا انغشينا و أخطأنا ). And in doing so we let Syria down.

Riyadh is here now to pack his things and go back to Syria to fight with the Syrian army (تطوع). I said how many people are feeling like you in Hasakaa, he said many – all his ربع [a term for family commonly used by Bedouins and Arabs of tribal affiliation]. He is 36 years old. Went to hajj twice. He’s Muslim Sunni.

I asked him what about the Christians in Hasakaa, he said they all left. Only the very weak and poor are left behind, but they are ok.

The FSA ripped off the power plant, dismantled all equipments, generators, transformers, even under ground cables were ripped out and were sold to a turkey.

He said this is not a fight for Assad, this is a fight for Syria.

Such an account looks almost engineered to tickle the ears of regime supporters, but it is real. It obviously, however, cannot reflect the experience of someone whose community has undergone direct bombardment from the regime. Those who have contributed to this long fight or have lived through the airstrikes and massacres of so many towns and villages would not suddenly make a political turnabout and say “we let Bashar down.” Such a statement will appear as the height of absurdity to a great number of Syrians, and even we find it almost bewildering. But it does reflect the feelings of some communities that have become disillusioned with rebel control, or have felt that “you rebels brought the fight to our neighborhood,” a sentiment we’ve seen crop up often.

It reflects the dilemma expressed by the writer of the email: “Syrians today have clarity in the choices being offered:  the regime, version 2.0; or a Salafi Islamic Banana Republic. My relatives, friends, and many Syrians I know who were staunch anti-regime revolutionaries early on are privately rethinking their position. It’s almost impossible for Syrians to admit defeat or mistakes (it’s related to some strange DNA mutation I will tell you about later!), but it’s not hard to see where a Sufi Syria would end up given these two distinct choices. The revolution is now proving to be incompatible with the hearts and minds of the Syrian masses.”

Regardless of the degree to which that last statement can be said to be true for various segments of the Syrian population, disillusionment has prompted even some who have been engaged at the forefront of the struggle against the regime to abandon the revolution. The situation alluded to above (the selling off of Syrian assets to Turkey) is a real problem that ultimately drove the head of the Farouq Brigades in Deir Ezzor, Yussef ‘Alke, to resign as leader, leave the Brigades, and declare the revolution a corrupt sham. In a recent statement he laid out 5 reasons for his departure:

1. That the trajectory of the revolution in Deir Ezzor has deviated from the right path and transformed [into a campaign of] acquiring wealth
2. That some leaders of the Farouq Brigade, in partnership with other brigades undertook the sale of the tools and equipment from the warehouses of sugar mills without our knowledge or agreement
3. The failure of the Revolutionary or Military Council or any subsidiary of the join leadership to support us, even with a single bullet, knowing that the everything that comes in the way of support from these groups goes to particular persons with a blind allegiance to the leaders of these councils
4. The new emergence of the old phenomenon of bloc formation, partisanship, and allegiances to foreign parties which people are forced to follow or face elimination, as has recently become clear
5. The lack of seriousness on the part of any party responsible for the Free Syrian Army or its supporters in the fight against the regime in Deir Ezzor—instead the main concern was, and still is, making financial deals with the regime

‘Alke gave just one example of destructive economic opportunism to occur in his local area (that of the sugar mill). A commodity that has been intensely fought over recently in several areas is wheat. A feud erupted in Tal Hamis (Hasakeh) over the right to distribute wheat between the FSA 313th Division and Ahrar al-Sham who attacked the FSA positions and took over the grain silos. Another scandal took place in al-Shadadi where the elected head of the Local Council was accused of appropriating wheat to sell it for his own profit. But the hottest affair of all is oil.

By Opening Oil Exports, Will the EU be Financing al-Qaida?

Where Syrian oil went before the sanctions – source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

Though the war seems far from over, the fight over oil has begun.

AP – EU lifts Syria oil embargo to bolster rebels

The European Union on Monday lifted its oil embargo on Syria to provide more economic support to the forces fighting to oust President Bashar Assad’s regime.

Opening up oil to help the rebels seems a little strange, since much of the territory that produces the oil is under the control of Jabhat al-Nusra. These areas are already experiencing conflict as various parties vie for control over oil.

Due to necessity or incentive or both, Syrians are already processing oil in outdoor, homemade refineries: Syrians take up backyard refining of crude oil – Daily Star:

Columns of black smoke rise from several points along the road in part of northern Syria. Here the smoke is not a sign of airstrikes but of crude oil being processed in makeshift refineries.

“People started doing it about one year ago but at that time we didn’t know how to,” says Ahmad, a 35-year-old farmer-turned-refiner. “We got the knowledge from someone from around here who had learned in Saudi Arabia,” he says, standing next to a big metal tank containing crude oil.

… Their tank has a capacity of 1,000 liters, though they only make it two-thirds full at a time because the refining process requires air, they say. A fire is lit underneath to heat the tank, eventually boiling the crude, and producing thick black smoke. As the crude boils, various products run off through two tubes which are cooled as they pass underwater through three ponds and then into a container that collects the resulting products. What comes out first, the brothers term “cooking gas,” which they simply allow to escape. Next comes petrol, then kerosene used in stoves, then diesel fuel. The pair call the final product “fat” and either add it back into the fire under the tank, or occasionally mix it with the diesel for use in some “heavy vehicles.” This process is a crude form of the fractional distillation process used at oil refineries around the world, and has proved profitable for the brothers.

Boiling and refining a tank takes them about four hours, and they estimate they make a 50-60 percent profit on each barrel, selling the products to locals. “Business is good,” Ahmad says smiling, his face and hands blackened by the smoke.

The brothers are unlikely to win any health and safety awards. Neither wears gloves nor protective gear, and Abdullah smokes a cigarette on the job. “It’s OK as long as you are not right next to the benzene [petrol],” he says matter-of-factly. “We haven’t had any [health] problem, nothing will happen to us,” he adds with a grin.

The brothers get their raw material from the Deir al-Zor countryside, driving two and a half hours in their truck to purchase oil barrels from middlemen or those in control of the oil fields: local tribes and the jihadist Nusra Front.

Nusra got involved in the oil business about six months ago, they say. “Nusra are operating in both lines, business and fighting,” Ahmad says.

… Ahmad says he’s not a fan of the Nusra Front, buying from them only out of necessity. Rebel brigades “Liwa al-Tawhid, Ahrar al-Sham, they are very good guys, but we don’t like Nusra,” he says.

The brothers buy crude about three times a week, picking up nine barrels a time. “Each well has a different price, depending on the quality of its oil,” Ahmad says. One 2,200-liter barrel runs from 500 to 10,000 Syrian pounds, approximately $5-$1000, but the cheapest barrels only yield about 50 liters of refined products, they say.

Local tribes first began controlling oil fields in the Deir al-Zor countryside about a year ago. … “When these tribes discovered the oil wells, the revolution in Deir al-Zor was over, they used to be poor and it went from revolution to oil industry.”

Deir al-Zor contains the largest energy reserves in Syria, which produced some 420,000 barrels of oil a day before the United States and the European Union banned the import of Syrian petroleum in 2011.

Oil and Gas Fields and Pipelines in Syria – Source: Tri-Ocean Energy

The current enterprise of oil in Syria is a dangerous business. It takes different forms in various regions, but it can involve the puncturing of pipelines to steal oil, smuggling, tremendous pollution, significant health hazards and physical danger, and the risk of armed disputes and localized political conflict over the product.

Here are several videos dealing with the process. This one features commentary lamenting the state of the oil business in the area: a bus (possibly a school bus) is used to transport oil, the roads and ground are covered in oil to the extent that people can no longer drive quickly on the road surface, even for urgent matters; this one shows oil shooting out of the ground with truck lined up to collect.

The following video from Deir Ezzor presents the enormous pollution problem. Men can be seen taking oil from pits filled with oil by breaking a pipeline. One such pit is shown burning; apparently when disputes arise as to who has claim to oil, it is sometimes set on fire so that no one has benefit from it. The gist of the commentator’s observation is: “As if the chemical attacks of the regime weren’t enough, now we have face the health threat of fumes arising from the illegal extraction of crude oil which is later refined in the north and then sold, by thieves who consider themselves part of the revolution, creating a lot of health and environmental hazards, including cancer.”

After being collected, refining the oil is another endeavor proving that necessity is the mother of invention. The following interesting videos show the refining process outdoors in: al-Safira (SE of Aleppo), Daret ‘Izza, again al-Safirah; and indoor refining in Ras al-Ain, Hasakeh.

Refining the oil is hazardous; in the above video, children can be seen working with the oil, and there have been reports of children being burnt to death while working to process oil. This video shows the aftermath of an explosion claiming the lives of those harvesting the oil. The commentary in the video says to the effect of: this is a message to opportunistic people, those who run after money, death is the end of all who covet. The bodies on the ground have been completely burnt, leaving skeletons. The tajwid playing in the background is of a sura that talks about visiting graveyards and seeing hellfire. The message seems to be that they were in the wrong for taking oil that wasn’t theirs, but who exactly does the oil belong to?

General Idriss (who has remained on the sidelines through the conflict) has placed a new request for a force of 30,000 troops, not to fight the regime but to control Syria’s oil fields. Syrian rebels seek control over oilfields – FT

… According to activists, however, many of those oilfields are now under the control of Jabhat al-Nusrah, the al-Qaeda-linked rebel group. General Selim Idriss, the western-backed head of the Supreme Military Council, told the Financial Times he wanted to assemble a 30,000-strong force of military defectors to secure oilfields, grain silos and cotton stocks, as well as crossing points on the Turkish and Iraqi borders.

Now that oil is on the table, it’s no wonder there’s a bigger push to get an interim government functioning. AP:

The Syrian opposition will not be able to sell its crude oil for at least another month due to a lack of real executive power, even though the EU has eased an embargo to help them, a prominent member of the Syrian National Council said on Monday.

… However, the opposition still does not have a provisional government to oversee possible sales as the coalition must still receive and then approve a proposal for a potential new leadership. “Without an interim government, nothing can be done now,” Osama Al-Qadi, general director of the Syrian economic task force under the umbrella of the opposition’s coalition told Reuters.

“By the end of the month, an interim government proposal will be submitted to the coalition for approval.” The Syrian National Council is a large Muslim Brotherhood-influenced bloc within the opposition group called the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces. Once an interim government is appointed, he expected governmental agreements to be pursued. “Then we will sign some agreements with neighboring countries to buy our crude, like Turkey,” he said. Meanwhile, the coalition has no control over crude oil that is already leaving the country by truck from the north east. “We consider this smuggling…”

Turkish Opposition Burn NATO Flag – AP

Oil and other goods (much of it looted) are already being sold off in Turkey, as mentioned by this article and in anecdotal accounts like that of the Natoor at the beginning of the post. The selling of Syria to Turkey is a serious problem, and a lot of inquiry could be pursued as to who is profiting in southern Turkey. The tragic consequences of these new economic opportunities emerging in lawless, rebel-held areas are examined in the next section.

Al-Musareb: Al-Nusra Punishes a Village Regime-Style

The results of the new game for oil have played out tragically in the village of al-Musareb, a village near Deir Ezzor, which experienced terror and destruction in an attack from Jabhat al-Nusra following a dispute over rights to oil that turned violent. The incident seems to be part of a larger conflict for power in the area between al-Nusra and local tribes. Information is scant on this situation; a Saudi source reported on it as well as a Reuters Arabic article based on a report from SOHR. In addition to these, we piece the story together based on video clips originating from pro-Nusra sources and articles on facebook pages (1, 2) belonging to a fighter group called Fawj Seif al-Rasul (“the Sword of the Prophet Regiment,” apparently made up of men from the village of al-Musareb) that was in conflict with al-Nusra. There are certainly more sides to this story yet to be told.

The story begins with this video in which men are fighting over a large truck full of oil. The truck is being fought over by men from the al-Saf tribe, and men from Jabhat al-Nusra. Supposedly, the truck was first stolen by thieves who later sold it to a man from the village of al-Musareb (who may or may not have known that it was stolen). Apparently, when the original owner learned that truck had wound up in the possession of an individual from al-Musareb, he appealed to al-Nusra to come to his aid. When the Nusra fighters arrived, however, they found themselves to be outnumbered by armed tribesmen.

The man with the brown hat in that video was the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra in this area, a Saudi named Qasura al-Jazrawi. There are two versions of the story at this point: al-Nusra claims that al-Jazrawi and his forces had to retreat because the tribesmen were more powerful, a few days after which the tribe invited Jabhat al-Nusra to lunch (presumably for negotiations), which turned out to be a bitter meal for al-Jazrawi, who ended up getting killed. The Seif al-Rasul rebels maintain that when al-Jazrawi and his men from al-Nusra came to deal with the problem of the oil truck, they did so aggressively with intimidation, threatening men with their guns. Because the confrontation was hostile, the tribesmen took the al-Nusra men prisoner, after which one of them tried to detonate explosives, at which point he was killed by the men of al-Musareb. This either led to the killing of al-Jazrawi directly, now viewed as a source of threat to the village, or to his killing after he tried to escape. In either case, young men are seen kicking al-Jazrawi’s body around (we see a lot of videos from Syria of people kicking dead bodies…) in the video of the aftermath.

After this, the “Hay al-Shari’a for the Deir Ezzor Countryside” issued a statement warning people of the area against “tying their fate to that of the killers whose hands have been tainted by the shedding of the blood of martyrs.” The speaker tells them that it is urgent that they leave the village (al-Musareb) that very night, claiming that other tribes and fighting groups are declaring war on the al-Saf tribe. He also claims that the village was being supported by the regime. He warns the men, women, children, and elderly who had no part in the killing to leave that village immediately because the mujahideen are coming.

Next, the elders of the al-Saf tribe and Saif al-Rasul issued a statement condemning the “criminal act” but saying that it is against their tradition to hand members of their tribe over to those outside the village for trial. They say that they will hand over vehicles and weapons, but urge them not to harm the innocent.

Following this, Jabhat al-Nusra plays detective, concluding that those in the video issuing the statement are the guilty party, based on the hand-jewelry worn by one of the men which appears to be the same as one in the video of the desecration of al-Jazrawi’s body.

The elders issue a second statement, the gist of which is: We condemn those people who killed the man, and their blood is “majdour” [according to Islam they become a legal target for killing to exact revenge], but only outside the village. We don’t agree that you enter the village. He quotes an ayah from the Qur’an and tells them that “we are on the same side.” (It is interesting how such exchanges are being conducted via uploaded video.)

The next footage we have is of al-Nusra’s attack on the village. They actually film their convoy setting out on the offensive, camera positioned at a series of road curves, apparently to accentuate the vehicles’ performance and evoke a sense of the heroic, set to one of the stirring jihadi anthems typical for such videos. After this sequence, we see the fighters holding blind-folded prisoners inside the village. But Nusra’s revenge is exacted on more than individuals: at just before 3:00 into the video we see the beginning of their demolition campaign, in which explosives are used to destroy homes. We see a total of 12 houses blown up in the remainder of the video, followed by footage of the aftermath, eerily resembling similar scenes in villages bombed by the regime. Narration informs us that one of the houses had belonged to the son of the mukhtar (mayor).

One claim was the al-Musareb was a center for thieves after the breakdown of security. The fighters of al-Nusra obtained a fatwa from the Hay al-Sharia that they could break into the homes of those suspected of stealing or killing, and if they are not present they can destroy the home. More aftermath videos show fire (either set inside homes or the result of explosives). One video claims that al-Nusra fighters stole from the home before destroying it. Narration in another aftermath video shows the destruction of a house claimed to have been owned by the mukhtar himself.

[Thanks to Heather Jenkins for pointing out that the photo we initially inserted here was misattributed to the al-Musareb case by the source we took it from, and was actually from a separate incident.]

Another video shows the fighters herding the prisoners which the video description refers to as the “killers of Qasura.” As the Nusra fighter is marching the prisoners along he introduces those conducting the operation as “the champions of al-Nusra and the Syrian Taliban movement.” This reference to the “Syrian Taliban” generated confused responses on the part of those commenting on YouTube, upon which the uploader posted a comment in reply saying that the fighter was merely “speaking spontaneously.” We do not see the final fate of the prisoners.

Jabhat al-Nusra’s attack led to the displacement of the people of the village, as well as the refugee population that had already fled other areas and taken refuge in al-Musareb. One report said that 14 houses were destroyed, another put the number as high as 30. The death toll was placed at near 50; a number of the Nusra fighters killed were Saudi and Tunisian, according to SOHR. One video showed a man claiming he’d been shot by a Nusra sniper.

The order of events is not clear, but it may be that at some point (after al-Jazrawi was killed?) tribesmen from the area gathered together and attacked the salt mine which had been al-Nusra’s headquarters, to try and eliminate their presence once and for all. Seif al-Rasul claims that the regime bombed the mine, leading to al-Nusra’s accusations that al-Musareb was working with the regime. We hear numerous statements in the videos from al-Nusra fighters referring to the men of al-Musareb as “shabiha.” Another aftermath video narrated by a Nusra fighter states that the village was “liberated from shabiha and the opportunists of the revolution.” It seems clear that the entire episode was the culmination of a long period of tension between al-Nusra and the locals, who had resisted al-Nusra’s ambition to gain control over the greater area of the countryside. The tribe had not welcomed Nusra’s interference in their lives nor allowed them to speak during the Friday prayers.

Though al-Nusra accused the people of the village of working with the regime, the locals expressed a different sentiment. The fighter group Seif al-Rasul posted videos from their village showing the effects of attacks from both the regime and al-Nusra. Talk about being caught between a rock and a hard place. Despite the accusations of being “shabiha,” the Seif al-Rasul fighters pointed out that they had participated in the Raqqa offensive that took the city from regime control. This group also posted videos purporting to show them in the siege of Raqqa, taking over checkpoints and helping people defect.

Introducing the Syrian Taliban

Though the above al-Nusra source attempts to downplay the mentioning of a group calling themselves the “Taliban,” it is now clear that there is a group operating within Syria, claiming to be the Taliban. We have found three videos in each of which the use of this name by the rebel group is self-declared. It is also clear that this group participated with Jabhat al-Nusra in the campaign on al-Musareb.

The following video shows the Taliban and al-Nusra roughly questioning a terrified prisoner in al-Musareb, who they accuse of having weapons of the regime. (Don’t rebels regularly use weapons taken from regime ammunition depots and overrun bases?) One appears to be carrying a stun baton. One tells him “I’m going to slaughter you, you animal.” Another tells him, “say the shahada,” (something Muslims believe will bring favor from God if said just prior to dying) “and may God have mercy on you.” It looks like we’re seeing the last moments of the young man’s life, but the video doesn’t include the execution; the last we see of the prisoner, he is blindfolded and placed in a vehicle.

In all three videos, members of the group refer to it as the “Islamic Taliban Movement.”

The following video contains the group’s statement of purpose:

The Opposition’s Ambivalent Response to al-Nusra’s Affiliation with al-Qaida, and the Plan to Introduce an Alternative Islamic Law

The proliferation of such groups has been a growing problem in Syria for some time, climaxing with the recent declaration of an Islamic state on the part of Jabhat al-Nusra, putting the opposition in an uncomfortable position. The revelation of sibling-hood between Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaida in Iraq was condemned in statements issued by some rebel groups (including Islamist ones). For example, Abu Basir al-Tartusi, a Syrian Salafist ideologue for Islamism in the revolution (mentioned in Aron Lund’s reports), took issue with the decision in a statement containing the following 7 points:

1. Jabhat al- Nusra didn’t consult with other sheikhs and scholars in the Levant (conflicting with Qur’anic sura “al-Shura” 38) before making the announcement
2. Assad will be the primary beneficiary of this development
3. The rebels will be spread thin by making new enemies to fight
4. Because of the announcement, the Syrian revolution will now be associated with all of the previous and future mistakes of al-Qaida in Iraq
5. This announcement will hurt the project of the Muslim Syrian People, which is the creation of a free and just Islamic Syrian state that has institutions, because it will give the US, China, India, and Russia more reasons to interfere in internal Syrian matters
6. The announcement will result in a lack of assistance for refugees and people in need of humanitarian aid; plus, aid to rebels will stop
7. “I hope that this announcement is not the beginning of the shedding of haram blood, on the basis of whoever opposes this announcement being killed” [he doesn't want to see people who disagree with the announcement getting killed for their position. He also mentions "sahawaat" الصحوات (referring to the tribes that the US empowered in Iraq to beat al-Qaida), i.e. he doesn't want al-Nusra to start treating groups not aligned with them like ISI treated the sahawaat] “to repeat the failed case of Iraq”

Al-Tartusi’s reasons for disapproving of the statement seem to have little to do with any moral objection to the ideology and tactics of al-Qaida, but are rather based on utilitarian considerations. Nevertheless, it is a great irony that Islamists such as al-Tartusi can be more outspoken with their criticism of Jabhat al-Nusra than can Syria’s official opposition. The National Coalition issued its own statement following the Nusra/ISI announcements, denouncing (with very unspecific language) “all positions that stand in the way of Syrian freedom and that do not align with the will of the people.” It went on: “The Syrian Coalition is deeply concerned about recent statements regarding the affiliations and ideologies of particular factions of the rebel forces.  We find it imperative to respond to these statements. The Syrian Coalition urges Jabhat al Nusra to stay within the ranks of nationalistic Syrians, to continue its efforts in fighting the Assad regime, and in supporting and protecting the freedom of all Syrian sects.”

Rather than express discomfort regarding the fact that al-Nusra’s leadership openly revealed that it was birthed by al-Qaida in Iraq (that was responsible for a high level of deliberately-sectarian violence and violence against minorities), the statement then maintains its opposition to the designation of al-Nusra as a terrorist organization, serving more as a defense of the front than a condemnation of its ideology. That the recent announcements of al-Qaida affiliation were accompanied by statements to the effect that “after so much struggle and sacrifice, we shouldn’t settle for the second-rate option of a democracy,” it is highly ironic that the National Coalition could urge Nusra to remain “within the ranks of nationalistic Syrians.”

They never were within those ranks.

The ambivalence in the opposition’s relationship with Nusra—a group they both need but whose positions they cannot accept—is illustrated in a statement issued by the Syrian Revolution Coordinators Union saying “We are proud of our jabhat al nusra mujaheeden brothers, and we protect their back as well as the backs of all the fighters on the fronts of struggle and jihad against the the dictator bashar al assad, but we refuse the pledge of allegiance that the jabhat made to skeikh alzawahiri.” It seems that Jabhat al-Nusra made this pledge, and its refusal on the part of others will not mean much.

Photo: Cihan, Ali Ünal

Following the announcement of al-Nusra’s affiliation with al-Qaida, Mu’az al-Khatib attempted to rationalize al-Nusra’s role in the revolution by claiming that al-Qaida in Iraq is more than one organization, apparently suggesting that Nusra is associated with the “real mujahids” who basically don’t exist anymore: Khatib says Syrians reject ideas of al-Qaeda, stresses moderate Islam – Today’s Zaman

Noting that al-Qaeda in Iraq can be divided into three groups, Khatib said: “The first group is composed of real mujahids [fighters] and most of those are liquidated. And the two other groups are affiliated with Syrian and Iranian intelligence. I ask my brothers [in the Nusra front] to change their name and speak about the love of God through good words.”

Also coming after al-Nusra’s declaration of an Islamic state, al-Khatib unveiled a project to introduce “a moderate form of Islamic law in all rebel-held areas of the country.” This clearly appears to be a reactionary attempt to maintain some say over the process of forming a legal system in a context where something called “Islamic law” is increasingly proving to be the most popular (or at least most successful) form of governance in areas under rebel control. Since al-Nusra and other extreme groups are the ones currently defining Islamic law for these areas, the political opposition probably feels forced into acting now to start promoting an “alternative shari’a” that will be less extreme, but still sell-able to the Islamists operating in Syria.

The main opposition to Syrian President Bashar Al Assad will begin establishing what it calls a moderate form of Islamic law in all rebel-held areas of the country, as part of an effort to prevent chaos and stop hardline interpretations of Islam from becoming entrenched.

Whether or not this will come to fruition is unknown, now that Khatib has resigned (for the second time) from the National Coalition. (Syria opposition names George Sabra interim chief) It may be pursued by other members of the Coalition.

Jabhat al-Nusra is Now an Iraq-to-Lebanon Phenomenon

On the same day that American attention was focused on the bombing at the Boston Marathon, Iraq experienced its deadliest day in a month. A significant number of people were killed by bombs around the country by what’s being called “a resurgent al-Qaida in Iraq” empowered by al-Nusra: Iraq attacks kill 55 less than a week before vote

Insurgents in Iraq deployed a series of car bombs as part of highly coordinated attacks that cut across a wide swath of the country Monday, killing at least 55 on the deadliest day in nearly a month. The assault bore the hallmarks of a resurgent al-Qaida in Iraq and appeared aimed at sowing fear days before the first elections since U.S. troops withdrew. There was no immediate claim of responsibility, but coordinated attacks are a favorite tactic of al-Qaida’s Iraq branch.

Iraqi officials believe the insurgent group is growing stronger and increasingly coordinating with allies fighting to topple Syrian President Bashar Assad across the border. They say rising lawlessness on the Syria-Iraq frontier and cross-border cooperation with a Syrian group, the Nusra Front, has improved the militants’ supply of weapons and foreign fighters.

The intensifying violence, some of it related to the provincial elections scheduled for Saturday, is worrying for Iraqi officials and Baghdad-based diplomats alike. At least 14 candidates have been killed in recent weeks, including one slain in an apparent ambush Sunday. … Monday’s attacks — most of them car bombings — were unusually broad in scope…

An Iraqi army military vehicle burns near a demonstration site in Ramadi, Iraq – AP Photo

Iraqi Sunnis have been protesting against the government for four months now, in what many have compared to “Arab Spring” protests. The mobilization of Sunnis around the country (including the use of arms) and the Iraqi crackdown on the protests are starting to resemble a “Syria-style uprising.”

Dozens Killed in Battles Across Iraq as Sunnis Escalate Protests Against Government – NYT

Gun battles erupted in cities with Sunni majorities across Iraq on Tuesday after security forces from the Shiite-led government stormed a Sunni protest encampment in a village near the northern city of Kirkuk. The clashes left dozens dead and wounded, and raised fears that the sectarian civil war that is roiling Syria might spill into Iraq.

After some grim headlines emerged (Iraq Clashes Kill 41 in Northern City of Mosul and Iraq on Edge After Deadly Raid on Protest Camp), Joel Rayburn (US Army Intelligence, worked in Iraq with David Petraeus) sent Dr. Landis the following emails (on the 23rd and 25th respectively):

The 23rd:

… you will have been monitoring the situation in Iraq today, after a raid by government troops on a protest camp in Hawjiah resulted in about 30 killed and dozens more wounded.  The protesters were Sunnis who had been camped out for demonstrations against the Maliki government for some weeks.  The incident sparked an angry reaction in Anbar, Samarra, Mosul, and some other Sunni cities.  13 armed men were killed when they launched revenge attacks against ISF checkpoints.  A crowd attacked an ISF convoy in Anbar and burned several vehicles (no casualties).  Three Sunni mosques were attacked in Baghdad, with dozens killed and wounded.  Current death toll stands at 56 according to the AP.

Political response has been fairly vehement.  Two Sunni ministers resigned their posts, one of them from Saleh Mutlaq’s party and the other from Osama Nujaifi’s party. When asked what his community’s response would be, Ahmed Abu Risha (the Awakening leader from Ramadi) said that ultimately Maliki would be tried and hanged for ordering today’s massacre just as Saddam had been hanged for ordering the 1982 massacre in Dujail.  … Two [other Sunni leaders] have called on Sunnis to defend themselves using force if necessary.  PM Maliki has announced the opening of an investigation to find out who is to blame for the violence.  The Ministry of Defense claims many of the killed and wounded protesters were Al Qaeda members, to which Abu Risha replied by asking, “Since when did Al Qaeda engage in demonstrations?” Meanwhile, Iraqiyah sources tell me they believe the raid was ordered by PM Maliki and carried out by General Ali Ghaidan, the Iraqi Ground Forces Commander (I’ve no other corroboration for this), and they also believe PM Maliki targeted the relatively small Hawijah protest camp in order to send a message to other larger protest groups. The timing of the raid, just three days after elections, would seem to lend itself to that interpretation, but on the other hand there have been many instances of Iraqi troops getting into sticky situations and winding up in big gun battles that they did not intend to be in (e.g., Basra 2008), so there is always room for miscalculation as an explanation.

The 25th:

The body of a gunman killed during clashes with Iraqi security forces lies on the ground in Hawija – AP Photo

… in the 4+ years since 2008, I have not seen the situation in Iraq closer to a return to civil war than it is right now.  Those of you who have been in northern Iraq and remember the violent fault lines there will recognize the seriousness of a report that tells us that 40 people were killed in Mosul in fighting between gunmen and Iraqi troops.  I have not seen that kind of thing happen in Ninewa since 2007.  Equally disturbing are the reports telling us that in a carryover from the violence in Hawijah earlier this week, gunmen have taken over Suleiman Beg near Tuz Khormato, the Jebel Hamrin area between Kirkuk and Diyala–another flashpoint that for years was an insurgent safe haven.  The situation is close to spinning out of control. AQI and the Naqshbandis are certainly playing a role in this, but the most dangerous aspect is that it is not merely the Sunni extremists who are moving toward revolt:  it is the Sunni center as well.  It seems as though the long-running political dispute, coupled with the government’s recent heavy handedness, together with the fallout of the Syrian conflict, have finally led the Awakening movement and the northern tribes back into armed resistance.  That’s the way it looks from my desk, anyway.

Many factors are responsible for what’s happening in Iraq, but a number of articles have discussed al-Nusra’s role in reinvigorating Sunni Islamist activities there. Moving to Lebanon, the recent period has shown a tremendous upsurge in Sunni Islamist and Salafi activity, aggravated by the Syrian situation and the sectarian context of areas along the Lebanese-Syrian border. This has culminated in the last few days with fatwas calling for jihad on the part of Lebanese Sunni clerics (in northern Tripoli, and in southern Saida) in support of Syrian Sunnis currently embattled in al-Qusayr, a Syrian city just east of the border of northern Lebanon. There is growing evidence of Hezbollah involvement in supporting the side of regime loyalists in Qusayr (though SOHR has suggested that those who have joined the fight are not necessarily crossing borders but are merely Shiites from the local area; however, a number of funerals for fallen Hezbollah fighters have recently taken place inside Lebanon, after bodies have been sent back from Syria). Hezbollah has said they have a “moral duty to defend Lebanese residents from Syrian rebels following the Beirut government’s failure to protect border villages…” (some villages have experienced shelling from the Syrian side). In response to this, the Sunni Lebanese clerics have attacked Hezbollah and called for a jihad in Qusayr, encouraging Sunnis to go fight in Qusayr on the side of the Sunnis/Syrian opposition (and claiming that they have already sent Sunni fighters who are currently fighting there). This means that Sunni and Shi’i Lebanese are currently fighting each other, inside Syria. Fighting in al-Qusayr is ongoing as the regime and the opposition vie for control.

————–

Update: we removed a video that was misattributed to Tripoli by the uploader, who seems to have mistaken “Jarablos” for “Tarablos.” Thanks to @Syrian_Scenes for alerting us.

Reports on Jabhat al-Nusra in Lebanon have begun appearing recently. This new article (in Arabic) from a Lebanese newspaper discusses a government security report detailing the foothold that al-Nusra has developed within the country so far. It discusses their structure and way of operating in Lebanon, listing among their bases: ‘Arsal (200 members), Tripoli (600 members), Akkar (300 members), Saida (250 members). The article says they are particularly thriving in poor, volatile neighborhoods and camps, and that they are targeting young people for membership. The Tripoli base is being led by Hossam al-Sabagh who the article links to bin Laden. An article in the Daily Star says more about Nusra’s development in Lebanon:

The latest statement released by Jabhat al-Nusra threatening to launch harsh strikes against Hezbollah, in Beirut in the city’s southern suburb and across Lebanon, is being taken seriously at the national security level and by Hezbollah. It can no longer be denied that Jabhat al-Nusra has found fertile ground in the Palestinian refugee camps in the country, among the nearly one million Syrian refugees there, as well as in Lebanese Sunni areas, especially in ​​northern Lebanon near the Syrian border.

As sectarian tensions erupt in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, we are seeing a high level of Sunni jihadist mobilization against governmental and Shi’i targets. Of course, this Sunni mobilization is about a number of factors and Jabhat al-Nusra is just one piece of a greater whole (though an important piece), but what is clear is that the Syrian conflict has helped ignite a broader trend of jihadism and Salafi activism, and the accompanying destabilization has given Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaida, and other groups a new level of space within which to operate and grow.

For more on what’s happening in al-Anbar and the al-Nusra connection, see this helpful report from Linda Lavender; see another report from her on the situation in the Bekka Valley.

Conclusion: Outsiders Reevaluate Their Positions as it Becomes Easier for the Regime to Sell Itself

The beginning of this post dealt with the phenomenon—perhaps widespread, probably not—of Syrians abandoning the revolution. Although the return to Assad’s ranks may be rare, disillusionment with the opposition is not. Fragmentation, factionalism, and chaos are now the law of the land, as ordinary Syrians now face a moral universe that offers up only shades of gray. The problem of the ascendance of extremist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra is chiefly responsible for the soul-searching being done by those now wondering which will be the lesser of two evil futures.

The reality of growing disillusionment with the revolution and the rebels is a very uncomfortable station on this journey, for many both inside and outside Syria. How can it be possible to suddenly decide the regime is an ally? A corrupt, selfish, and brutal regime was largely responsible for this descent into chaos in the first place. This regime has no moral capital; its massacres continue. And yet, as many of its doomsday predictions come true, the troubling question is: how many of its battles are being fought against extremist movements that would be opposed by the government of any nation?

This post explored several topics involving the role of Jabhat al-Nusra, which now enables al-Qaida-aligned jihadi groups to operate from Iraq to Lebanon. Anxious lest the US become a tacit ally of al-Qaida, the administration proscribed Jabhat al-Nusra. At the time, many policy makers thought this was premature and unwise, and the charge was leveled that Obama lacked leadership. But in retrospect, the prescience of this decision is becoming clear, and it continues to raise the question of what positive role the United States can play in this conflict.

Radicalization is not the result of Washington’s refusal to intervene or Obama’s “lack of leadership.” Rather, it is the result of Syria’s national breakdown. The U.S. could not have prevented Syria’s civil war or its profound identity crisis. In Iraq, the U.S. took out Saddam’s regime in 3 short weeks, dissolving both the army and the Ba’ath party. But despite a swiftly-implemented intervention, the U.S. was not able to prevent Iraq’s descent into sectarian civil war and radicalization. These were the result of a contest over the state’s basic identity, a question that has never had a cohesive answer since the alien framework of the nation state was imposed on the region.

Washington analysts who have been forecasting the demise of al-Qaida following the death of Bin Laden must reconsider. Al-Qaida is not dead; the one we knew in Afghanistan may be significantly degraded, but a potent new al-Qaida incarnation is emerging, one that is much closer to establishing its conception of Islamist rule in the heart of the Middle East. 

This phenomenon is one aspect of the Syrian regime’s battle. They wanted the battle to be about this, rather than a crackdown on a peaceful protest movement, in order to legitimize their claim to continued power. The rise of Nusra helps to frame the regime in the light of an indispensable defense against extremism, and it is quick to point this out to anyone listening.

Because of the regime’s many crimes and atrocities throughout this conflict (not to mention its previous decades of oppression), it has been easy to ignore its one-sided narrative since the beginning of the uprising. Nevertheless, many of its predictions have come to fruition. We are so used to outrageous propaganda in this conflict that when two archbishops were kidnapped in Aleppo, the announcement from regime sources that Chechens were involved prompted me to laugh out loud, as I assumed it was a ploy to exploit the sympathies of those currently focused on the Boston bombing. But it turned out that they were telling the truth.

The regime’s primary message to the international community from the beginning was: if you oppose us and weaken our stabilizing control here, extreme Salfisim will wash across the region. That their predictions are coming truer every day spells their own demise while simultaneously vindicating (or at least demonstrating the soundness of) their original position. Claims that al-Nusra and similar groups were engineered by the regime in order to improve its position as indispensable guardian of stability seem farfetched, but still, the more the uprising becomes characterized by extremism, the sounder the credibility of the regime appears.

The Syrian regime is now working hard to convince the international community see things its way. The new maneuvering space enjoyed by al-Qaida and Salafi militias is prompting some reporters and not a few policy analysts to begin reevaluating support for the revolution, or at least to begin considering the perspective of Damascus a little more, as the following articles demonstrate.

The dilemma is summarized thus: Our sympathies lie with the aspirations of those freedom-seeking Syrians who oppose their corrupt, cruel, and despotic regime, and simultaneously the West and that regime are fighting on the same side in the war on terror.

Syria Plays on Fears to Blunt American Support of Rebels – NYT – Anne Barnard - Important video, please view

Inside Syria: Veil of normality in Damascus – BBC

The international community’s relationship with the conflict becomes complicated as outsiders begin to see two enemies inside Syria: the Assad regime and al-Qaida:

Defeating al-Qaeda in Syria, Not Assad – Antiwar

U.S. Fears Syria Rebel Victory, for Now – Wall Street Journal

Senior Obama administration officials have caught some lawmakers and allies by surprise in recent weeks with an amended approach to Syria: They don’t want an outright rebel military victory right now because they believe, in the words of one senior official, that the “good guys” may not come out on top.

Administration officials fear that with Islamists tied to al Qaeda increasingly dominating the opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad , too swift a rebel victory would undercut hopes for finding a diplomatic solution, according to current and former officials. It would also shatter national institutions along with what remains of civil order, these people say, increasing the danger that Syrian chemical weapons will be used or transferred to terrorists.

This assessment complicates the White House’s long-standing push to see President Assad step from power. It also puts a spotlight on the U.S.’s cautious approach to helping the opposition, much to the frustration of U.S. allies including France and the U.K., which want to arm Syria’s moderate rebels.

… “We all want Assad to fall tomorrow, but a wholesale institutional turnover overnight doesn’t make a whole lot of sense,” a senior U.S. official said. “The end game requires a very careful calibration that doesn’t tip the meter in an unintended way toward groups that could produce the kind of post-Assad Syria that we aren’t looking for.”

… The U.S. administration considers Syria’s conflict a war of attrition, however, and believes that the rebels are gradually gaining the upper hand, an assessment the administration doesn’t believe Mr. Assad accepts. Officials say it will require delicate maneuvering to restrain the influence of radicals while buying time to strengthen moderate rebels who Western governments hope will assume national leadership if Mr. Assad can be persuaded to leave.

… The U.S. also wants to keep technocratic elements of the state in place, seeking to avoid a repeat of what happened in Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion. Then, civil authority evaporated after the U.S. disbanded the Iraqi military.

The U.S. fears that the abrupt collapse of the Assad regime will lead to Syria’s Balkanization, threatening North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally Turkey, key partner Jordan as well as neighboring Iraq, whose government looks increasingly fragile, according to a senior defense official. …

… But several current and former officials briefed on these calibrated efforts to bolster moderate rebels without strengthening the Islamists said the U.S. doesn’t have the influence to precisely control the flow of aid.

“This is like Goldilocks, but I don’t think we live in a world in which we have porridge that’s just right,” said a U.S. official familiar with the new approach.

Just how complicated is the Syrian conflict, Goldilocks? Chew on this porridge:

Syria Is Complicated — Simultaneous Conflicts Always Are - The war in Syria is so enduring and vexing precisely because it is such a multi-layered conflict, comprising at least six separate battles taking place at the same time, argues Rami G. Khouri

The easiest way to describe the events in that region has been to speak of Sunni-Shiite fighting, or antagonisms between pro- and anti-Syrian government elements. The involvement of Hizbullah adds a significant new element to the mix, and also helps to clarify what the fighting in and near Syria is all about. It is much more than merely “spillover” of the Syrian war into Lebanon. I have previously described the war in Syria as the greatest proxy battle of our age, and I believe that is now clearer than ever as we see how Syria comprises a rich and expansive web of other conflicts that play themselves out on a local, regional and global scale.

The war in Syria is so enduring and vexing precisely because it is such a multi-layered conflict, comprising at least six separate battles taking place at the same time:

1. The domestic citizen revolt against the Assad family regime that has ruled Syria for 43 years is the first layer of the Syrian conflict, which reflects a widespread spirit of citizen activism for freedom, rights and dignity that continues to define much of the Arab World today. After the non-violent demonstrations that erupted across the country in spring 2011 elicited a violent military response from the regime, this political conflict quickly became a militarized war.

2. This armed battle for control of Syria reignited the second layer of conflict that has defined the region since the 1950s — the Arab cold war between assorted regional forces that keep shifting over time, but can most easily be described as conservative vs. radical, or capitalist vs. socialist, or royalist vs. republican, or Islamo-monarchist vs. Arab nationalist, or pro-Western vs. anti-Western, though none of these simplistic black-and-white dichotomies is fully accurate. At its simplest, this Arab cold war for decades has been led on one side by Saudi Arabia and its conservative allies, and on the other by governments such as those in Syria, Egypt or Iraq at various moments.

3. The third layer of conflict in Syria is the old Iranian-Arab rivalry, recently also often defined as Shiite-Sunni rivalry. This is symbolized by the Iranian government’s alliance with Syria since 1979, and recently including the close structural ties between Iran and Hizbullah (or, more accurately, the ties between Hizbullah and the institution of the Wilayet el-Faqih, or the Supreme Leader, in Iran). Iran’s strategic links with both Syria and Hizbullah have been among the few foreign policy achievements of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, so the Iranian, Syrian and Hizbullah leaderships will battle hard to maintain those mutual benefits that all of them derive from their relationships.

4. The fourth battle taking place in Syria is the renewed but more limited version of the Cold War between the United States and Russia (with other players like China and assorted European states hanging around to pick up energy contracts and other gains). At its simplest, this renewed Son of Cold War sees Russia taking a determined stand in Syria to prevent the United States from unilaterally deciding which Arab leaders go and which ones stay, while also burnishing its renewed credentials as a global power. Almost a quarter century after the end of the original Cold War, Russia is trying to recalibrate global power relations, formally closing the “post-Cold War” era in which the USA was the world’s sole superpower in a uni-polar world.

5. The fifth conflict in Syria — like the domestic citizen revolt against autocracy that reflects a regional trend — is the century-long tension between the power of the centralized modern Arab developmental and security state and the forces of disintegration and fragmentation along ethnic, religious, sectarian, national and tribal lines. These sub-national, ancient and primordial identities defined our societies long before the imposition of the modern Arab state, and are always there to reaffirm themselves when that state fails to function efficiently and meet citizen needs.

6. The sixth and most recent strain of conflict in Syria is between the forces of Al-Qaeda-inspired Salafist fanatic militants, like Jabhat el-Nusra, and mainstream opposition groups fighting to overthrow the Assad family regime, like the Muslim Brotherhood or broader, more secular groups, like the Syrian National Opposition Coalition or Council. Hysteria has typically gripped some analysts in the region and in the West today as they fret over the prospect of Nusra and others like them taking control of all or parts of post-Assad Syria — an impossible prospect, in my view.

So what we witness in and around Syria is a lot more complicated than spillover into neighboring countries or Sunni-Shiite rivalry.

The challenge of involvement in such a difficult scenario is dealt with by Helene Lavoix for Red (team) Analysis: Potential Futures for Syria in the Fog of War (1)

…  The Syrian war is a challenging problem for strategic foresight and warning because, besides the humanitarian disaster, the risks to regional and global peace and stability continuously increase, because the conflict is redrawing the strategic outlook of the region while participating into the global paradigm shift, and, finally, because the fog of war makes our anticipatory task more difficult and complex.

… We are facing three – related – sets of problems. First, we must deal with the war itself, where three, four or five types of Syrian actors and their “international backers” – or even more according to typologies, as we shall discuss below – and not two, fight for power. Second, we must prepare for the following peace while, third, evaluating and considering the still being redesigned strategic environment.

… We are faced with cognitive biases, or more specifically with the problem of enduring cognitive models in the face of new evidence, when the initial model was created early and with very few available evidence (Anderson, Lepper, and Ross, 1980). The tendency of our human brain to also overestimate “intentional centralized direction and planning” (Heuer, chapter 11, bias 2) is also probably at play. …

Despite the challenges, the opposition doesn’t give up, and may in fact soon begin speaking… with themselves: Pan-Syrian dialogue may begin in near future – internal opposition

A Pan-Syrian dialogue may begin in the near future, a representative of the Popular Front for Change and Liberation in Syria, Qadri Jamil, said after talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. “Whereas before the idea of a dialogue was purely theoretical, now there is every chance of translating it into reality,” Jamil said…

“Now we are discussing the details of the opportunity for coming to the negotiating table – what oppositional factions will be participating, the agenda, and how quickly that may be done,” he said. Asked by Itar-Tass if there was a possibility such consultations might take place before the summer, he replied that there was no chance of setting firm dates in politics. “But we can hope this may happen in the foreseeable future,” Jamil said. “Several months and, possibly, even weeks is the likely deadline.”

Round Up / Misc

Umayyad Mosque Minaret Destroyed In Aleppo – HP

Half of Americans can’t identify Syria on a map (young Republicans do slightly better) – WP

Qatar is focus as U.S. weighs concerns about arming Syrian extremists – WP

When President Obama welcomes the leader of Qatar to the White House on Tuesday, he will doubtless thank the Qataris for hosting a major U.S. air base in the Persian Gulf, and for their help on a wide range of strategic issues from Libya to Afghanistan. But he is also likely to press Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani to ensure that none of the weapons Qatar is sending to Syrian rebels end up with the Jabhat al-Nusra…

Jordan opens skies for IAF drones flying to Syria

Christians Leave Deir Ezzor as Last Church Blown Up (claim priests)

The last remaining Christian church in Deir Azzor was destroyed in an explosion by armed groups as they intensify their efforts to take the city and nearby airport. In recent days increasing amounts of footage have been uploaded documenting intense fighting between armed groups and the Syrian army. The Capuchin Franciscans have been present in Deir Ezzor in the northeast and Al-Suwayda  in the southwest – in a place called “Mountain of the Druze (Jabal al-Druze)”. Two friars remained in Deir Ezzor up until the recent explosion at the church, with the help of the Lebanese and Syrian International Red Cross.

In a statement posted on the website of The Order of Friars Minor, a report of the explosion said:

“There was an explosion near our church in Deir Ezzor that destroyed it,” writes Br. Antoine Haddad, Viceprovincial Minister of Lebanon, in a message to us. The news was picked up by the media because the two Capuchin friars who lived there, with the help of the Lebanese and Syrian International Red Cross, and the nuncios of Lebanon and Syria, left with the Sisters of Mother Teresa and about ten seniors who lived in our place. They were the last remaining Christians in the area to leave. The church was completely destroyed, but until now it was not possible to know if the friary was hit or not, because there are no longer any Christians in Deir Ezzor, apart from one who returned because he lived in the ‘quieter’ area of the city….

Israel admits to attacking Syria arms convoy

Hacked by “Syrian Electronic Army,” the AP Twitter Feed Sends False Report of Explosions at White House

The group behind the attack

Chicago teen arrested by FBI for planning to join Nusra

Israeli buffer zone inside Syria considered by Netanyahu

Buffer Zones have become the topic de jour in Washington DC. For some time, the language used in the White House to frame the Syria problem has been that of containment. Here are some of the oft repeated phrases I have been hearing from White House insiders:

• “Keep the violence inside Syria
• “Cauterize”
• “Prepare for Syrian failure”
• “Shore up the neighbors”
• “There are no good guys in Syria”

This gloomy assessment of the prospects for Syria has created a cottage industry of policy proposals from Washington think tanks that appropriate White House language and focus on containment. They present possible plans for limiting the destabilization of the region and for shoring up weaker countries, such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq.

And for building “buffer zones” to ensure that the “Las Vegas rules” apply to Syria: that what takes place in Syria stays in Syria.

Here is Dennis Ross of WINEP on buffer zones: U.S. Policy Toward Syria,  Dennis Ross,  Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,  April 11, 2013

….[A] requirement of our policy now is to hedge against the disintegration of Syria. I often say that the Las Vegas rules don’t apply to Syria; what takes place in Syria won’t stay there. Without making the fragmentation of the country a self – fulfilling prophecy, we need a containment strategy. Much of the opposition is highly localized. We need to think about how buffers can be built up at least in southern Syria, along part of the Syrian/Iraqi border and in the north. Investing in local governance — as part of a coherent design with the British, French, Saudis, Emirates, Jordanians, Turks and others — may be a way to hedge against the unknowns of the future and build the stake of those in Syria to stay put and shape their own future. I don’t suggest that devising a containment strategy will be easy, but we have an interest in doing so and many of our allies, particularly those in the Gulf, do as well. And, the Saudis and Emiratis certainly understand this.

Ross proposes a buffer zone along the Jordanian border. He also earges the establishment of buffers along the Turkish border (already created by Patriot Missiles if they are used against Syrian aircraft) and a Kurdish buffer along the Iraq border. But the focus of his attention is the Jordan border and also presumably protecting the Occupied Golan and Israel from possible attacks by al-Qaida or militias with an anti-Israeli animus.

Ross in a recent talk expressed the hope that Saudi Arabia might be willing to fund such a militia which would serve to protect the monarchy in Jordan, a Saudi interest. The US could help train it.

US special forces are already training Syrian rebels in Jordan. And preparations have been made to possible send up to 20,000 if chemical weapons are used by Syria.

David Pollock, also of WINEP, responded to Ross with Syria’s Forgotten Front in the The New York Times on April 16, 2013.

To keep yet another Syrian frontier from spiraling downward, Washington should urge Israel and the mainstream Syrian opposition to focus on keeping Hizballah and jihadist groups away from the border.

As the civil war in Syria rages on, the risk that Israel will be drawn into the fray is rising….  The risk that Israeli retaliation for cross-border fire could spiral into a major skirmish, or even a larger Israeli intervention to set up a buffer zone in Syria, is real. To prevent it, the United States should broker a tacit agreement between Israel and moderate elements of the Syrian opposition.

Israel and the Syrian opposition don’t have much in common, but they do share some important mutual enemies, namely Hezbollah and Iran, both of which are fighting furiously to save Bashar al-Assad’s government.

This convergence of interests provides an opening for America to quietly strike a deal between Israel and the leadership of the Syrian opposition: Israel should agree to refrain from arming proxies inside Syria to protect its border; and the Syrian opposition should work to keep extremist groups like Hezbollah and Jabhat al-Nusra and other affiliates of Al Qaeda far away from the Israeli frontier. This would demonstrate the Syrian opposition’s bona fides to potential Western supporters and dissuade Israel from intervening or arming allies in Syria.

He goes on to argue that if Israel built a buffer zone inside Syria with a proxy force to protect the Golan , it could backfire as “happened in Lebanon, with disastrous long-term consequences, beginning in the late 1970s when Israel invaded southern Lebanon and set up the South Lebanon Army to protect its border before staging a second, larger invasion in 1982. The result was the creation of Hezbollah, with Iranian support, to “liberate” south Lebanon — a threat that remains today.”

The problem with buffer zones is that they could lead to the dismemberment of Syria. What is more, Obama seems to have little taste for such involvement in Syrian. He seems to believe that they would lead to mission creep.

Bill Frelick, the refugee policy director at Human Rights Watch, writes in the New York Times: Blocking Syrian Refugees Isn’t the Way.

The refugee burden that Syria’s neighbors are shouldering is heavy and should not be borne alone. But keeping people fleeing for their lives in buffer zones inside Syrian borders risks trapping rather than protecting them.

Yet this is precisely what President Michel Suleiman of Lebanon proposed on April 4, joining others such as Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu of Turkey, who made a similar call in November 2011, and Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour of Jordan, who spoke in January of securing “safe havens” inside Syrian territory, saying of potential new refugee flows, “We will stop them and keep them in their country.”

It appears that steps are being taken to create such border zones. The United States is working with Jordanian authorities to train Syrian opposition forces in what may be an attempt to set up a buffer zone on the southern border of Syria for defectors from the army and displaced civilians….

It seems quite clear that all of Syria’s neighbors have an interest in creating buffer zones in Syria, particularly if someone else will pay for them and if the US will help manage them. This is not a solution that will be attractive to either the US or Syria.

News Round Up

How Chemical Weapons Could Change Strategy For Syria, Talk of the Nation
April 23, 2013,  30 min 20 sec

• Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies, University of Oklahoma
• Amy Smithson, senior fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

On Syria, Jordan Caught Between Hesitant U.S. and Activist GCC
By: Muhammad Muslih | Briefing

In responding to the growing security crisis emanating from Syria, Jordan finds itself caught between the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council, with the U.S. insisting on restraint in Syria and the GCC pushing hard to tip the military balance against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Jordan’s King Abdullah must negotiate these competing forces to manage what he sees as an imminent threat in Syria.

Syrian Regime Shoring Up Hold on Capital, Coast
By RYAN LUCAS, 2013-04-22

BEIRUT (AP) — After watching much of Syria’s territory slip into rebel hands, President Bashar Assad’s regime is focusing on the basics: shoring up its hold on Damascus and the strip of land connecting the capital with the Mediterranean coast.

In the past week, government troops have overrun villages near the Lebanese border and suburbs of Damascus, including two districts west of the capital where activists say regime forces killed more than 100 people. The advances have improved the regime’s footing in strategic areas that are seen as crucial to its survival.

In many ways, Assad’s government has little choice at this point in the civil war, analysts say. Rebels have captured much of northern and eastern Syria, seizing control of military bases, hydroelectric dams, border crossings and even a provincial capital. Those areas are home to most of the country’s oil fields, and the losses have deprived the regime of badly needed cash and fuel for its war machine.

But those provinces — Raqqa, Hassakeh and Deir el-Zoura — are located hundreds of miles (kilometers) from the capital. Rebel advances there pose no direct threat to the regime’s hold on Damascus — the ultimate prize in the civil war — and any effort to claw back the lost territory would demand manpower and military hardware, neither of which the regime is inclined to invest at the moment.

Instead, it has used its remaining airbases and military outposts in those areas to shell and bomb the territory it has lost in an attempt to forestall the opposition from establishing an interim administration in the rebel-held regions.

“What’s important for the regime is not to leave any buffer zone, or any security zone for the rebels,” said Hisham Jaber, a retired Lebanese army general who heads the Middle East Center for Studies and Political Research in Beirut.

While keeping the rebels off-balance in the lands it has lost, the regime at the same time has dedicated its resources to Damascus and securing what it widely believed to be Assad’s Plan B — a retreat to the Mediterranean coastal region that is the heartland of his Alawite minority, which views its own survival as being tightly intertwined with that of the regime.

Key to that strategy is control of the corridor running from Damascus to the city of Homs and from there to the coast.

Syrian opposition to establish moderate form of Islamic law
Phil Sands, Apr 18, 2013

ISTANBUL // The main opposition to Syrian President Bashar Al Assad will begin establishing what it calls a moderate form of Islamic law in all rebel-held areas of the country, as part of an effort to prevent chaos and stop hardline interpretations of Islam from becoming entrenched.

The legal code was drawn up by Muslim scholars, judges and top anti-Assad politicians in advance of meetings this week in Istanbul convened by the Syrian National Council (SNC), where transitional justice arrangements are being discussed.

The opposition hopes that an interim government, as yet unformed, will apply a version of the new legal system nationwide, after it goes into effect in areas currently controlled by the insurgents.

Different systems of Sharia now govern pockets of Syrian territory controlled by the rebels. Some are enforced by Jabhat Al Nusra, a militant group affiliated with Al Qaeda, prompting fears that its interpretation of Islamic law is filling the legal vacuum.

Launching the initiative on Monday, Moaz Al Khatib, president of the SNC and himself a widely respected Islamic cleric, appealed for a moderate, fair legal system, which would meet demands for justice and head off the growing influence of extremists.

“I want to talk frankly. When there is injustice, there is a revolution against that injustice. In the same way there should be a revolution in religious thought,” he said.

“The goal of religion is to liberate human beings, all of the prophets came to liberate the people.”

Extremists, including groups such as Al Nusra, one of the most powerful rebel factions, should not be allowed to spread their ideas, Mr Al Khatib said.

“We do not need ignorant people coming to Syria and teaching us the meaning of religion,” he said, chiding members of Al Nusra for trying to enforce an uncompromising version of Islam on a country with traditions of greater religious tolerance.

“Some in Al Nusra have told women they must wear hijab and that is not right, if you want to preach, do it well, you can talk, you cannot command, there is no compulsion in Islam,” he said.

Al-Hayyat In this article the author argues that the “Sunni majority” is a made up Baathi concept. Sunnis do not form a solid block united by similar views. He does a good job in listing the different groups within that “majority”. The whole point of the article is to suggest that offering guarantees to the minorities in Syria is not the Sunnis job because the Sunni community itself is a group of minorities with conflicting views. [Tuesday, April 16, 2013]

Israel Is Choosing Regional Isolation, Not Alliances By Moshe Ma’oz | Haaretz, Apr.18, 2013

Israel has a rare chance to build a U.S.-coordinated alliance with the pragmatic Sunni Muslim states that have emerged from the Arab Spring – but the new coalition’s lack of political will is likely to block this happening.

… Egypt and other new Islamic regimes in the Arab world have continued to support the Saudi/Arab peace initiative, while the Palestinian issue has gained great interest and solidarity among the Muslim masses, notably amongst militant groups. Simultaneously hatred for Israel and for Jews continues to increase among many Arabs and Muslims, because of the continued occupation of Palestinian lands by Israel, especially of East Jerusalem with its Muslim holy shrines.

Consequently it is in Israel’s vital interest to neutralize or decrease this negative sentiment while improving its image and position among moderate/pragmatic Muslim groups and governments. These goals can be achieved by accepting the Arab peace initiative and renewing the peace process with the Palestinians. Such crucial steps are likely to facilitate Israel’s potential alliance with Sunni Muslim states, notably Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf Emirates, vis-à-vis the common hazard emanating from Iran and its allies – Lebanese Hezbollah and the Alawi government in Syria.

Such an alliance must be coordinated by the U.S. with the tacit, gradual participation of Israel – provided Israel makes substantial progress in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians and simultaneously accepts the Arab Peace initiative. Alas, as during his previous government, the Netanyahu’s current cabinet is unlikely to assume such a pragmatic policy.

A significant change may occur only under U.S. pressure and with a reshuffle of the Israeli government, namely replacing Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party with the Labor party (and perhaps also Shas). The chances for this happening are slim; it is far more likely that Israel will continue to aggravate and intensify its regional and international isolation.

 Israel ready to act on Syria weapons, warns Netanyahu – BBC

Mr Netanyahu, in an exclusive interview with the BBC’s Lyse Doucet, said Israel’s concern was “which rebels and which weapons?”

“The main arms of concern to us are the arms that are already in Syria – these are anti-aircraft weapons, these are chemical weapons and other very, very dangerous weapons that could be game changers,” he said.

“They will change the conditions, the balance of power in the Middle East. They could present a terrorist threat on a worldwide scale. It is definitely our interest to defend ourselves, but we also think it is in the interest of other countries.”

Assad Hold on Power in Syria ‘Tenuous’, U.S. Official Says

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad retains only a “tenuous hold” on power after two years of armed strife as opposition forces have grown more effective, according to the Pentagon’s top military intelligence official.

Assad’s government “maintains the military advantage — particularly in firepower and air superiority,” and his inner circle “appears to be largely cohesive,” Defense Intelligence Agency Director Army Lieutenant General Michael Flynn said in testimony prepared for delivery later today to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Still, the government “continues to struggle with defections, morale problems and an overall inability to decisively defeat the opposition,” Flynn said in the remarks obtained by Bloomberg News. He also said the Syrian military “is likely stretched thin by constant operations.”…

Committee Chairman Carl Levin, D-Mich., asked Hagel and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey, who testified with him, if Obama had asked the Pentagon to recommend how to apply “any additional military pressure” on the Syrian regime of President Bashar Assad.

“We’ve had national security staff meetings at which we’ve been asked to brief the options, but we haven’t been asked for a recommendation,” Dempsey said.

“We’ve not been asked,” Hagel said. “As I said, I’ve not been asked by the president.”

Regime Breaks Siege of Wadi al-Deif
By Jonathan Dupree, April 18, 2013, ISW

On April 14, 2013, regime forces broke the 6-month siege of the Wadi al-Deif and Hamidiya military compounds outside of Maarat al-Numan, putting the rebel opposition in the area on the defensive and reestablishing overland supply lines to the bases. [i] The regime is now able to redistribute its military forces in the north, particularly its airpower which was tied up running dangerous supply drops to the troops besieged in the two bases, and engage the opposition for control of the Aleppo-Damascus highway. Although this new development will impact military operations in the northern provinces for both sides, it also highlights the military deficiencies that exist among the opposition groups and the continued capabilities of the regime. Although the regime has given up territory to the opposition, it has largely done so by choice to consolidate forces in more strategic locations, and it retains the ability to seize the strategic advantage when the opportunity presents itself……

Syria’s Assad says West will pay for ‘supporting’ Qaeda

President Bashar Al Assad warned on Wednesday the West that it will pay a heavy price for its alleged support of Al Qaeda in Syria and said his regime’s defeat is not an option….

Dura-Europos Looted and Vandalized by FSA
Posted by: ProSyriana April 16, 2013

Maamoun Abdul-Karim, director general of antiquities and museums uncovered a dangerous crime against Syria and its history. The systematic looting of Syrian antiquities by Turkish, Lebanese and Iraqi artifacts merchants with the help of FSA groups.

Recently 300 unauthorized digging operations (holes) were discovered in Dura-Europos.

Maamoun Abdul-Karim pointed out that this illegal digging to steal antiquities have also compromised the underground structure of the whole site. 50 similar holes were found in Mari. This is endangering the whole Syrian historical heritage, a heritage that belongs to the whole world not only Syria.

Both sites are being systematically looted and vandalized by the FSA, professional thieves & criminals, and foreign artifacts merchants. FSA threatened the locals with death if they dared interfere.

Robert Fisk: The Syrian army would like to appear squeaky clean. It isn’t

The Syrian military, whether it admits it or not – and I’m not happy with the replies I got from Syrian officers on the subject last week – work with the shabiha (or “village defenders” as one soldier called them), who are a murderous, largely Alawite rabble who have slaughtered hundreds of Sunni civilians. Maybe the International Court in the Hague will one day name Syrian soldiers responsible for such crimes – be sure they won’t touch the West’s warriors – but it will be impossible for the Syrian army to write the shabiha out of the history of their war against the “terrorists”, “armed groups”, Free Syria Army and al-Qa’ida.

The attempted disconnect has already begun. Syrian troops are fighting at the request of their people to defend their country. The shabiha have nothing to do with them. And I have to say – and no, yet again, I am not comparing Bashar with Hitler or the Syrian conflict with the Second World War – that the German Wehrmacht tried to play the same narrative game in 1944 and 1945 and, then, in a much bigger way, in post-war Europe. The disciplined lads of the Wehrmacht never indulged in war crimes or genocide against the Jews in Russia, Ukraine or the Baltic states or Poland or Yugoslavia. No, it was those damned SS criminals or the Einsatzgruppen or the Ukrainian militia or the Lithuanian paramilitary police or the proto-Nazi Ustashe who besmirched the good name of Germany. Bulls***, of course, though German historians who set out to prove the criminality of the Wehrmacht still face abuse.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed his growing fears of weapons falling into the wrong hands in Syria, and stressed “we are prepared to defend ourselves if the need arises.”

http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/brotherhood-denies-plans-for-islamist-rule-in-syria

Syria’s Assad reduces sentences for some rebels

Business Insider: The West Has ‘Hard Evidence’ That Assad Used Chemical Weapons In Syria. 2013-04-12

REUTERS/Benoit Tessier Western nations have “hard evidence” that chemical weapons have been used at least once by the Syrian army, diplomats told Agence France-Presse. “In one case we have hard evidence,” a western diplomat said. “There are several …

Syrian regime’s air power keeps rebels in check
By BARBARA SURK — Apr. 11

BEIRUT (AP) — President Bashar Assad has exploited his greatest advantage in the Syrian civil war — his air power — to push back rebel advances and prevent the opposition from setting up a rival government in its northern stronghold…..

While the air force is an important tool in Assad’s battle for survival, it’s not his last one, said Joshua Landis, a Syria expert at the University of Oklahoma.

“It’s the 3 million Alawites who believe that they will be ethnically cleansed by the opposition if the rebels overthrow Assad,” Landis said. “It’s because of the fear of those who could come after him that has spread around Syrian minority communities in the past year of the revolution, that many — including Sunnis — continue fighting on the regime’s side.”

In their campaign against the opposition, the Syrians have been using helicopters, MiG jets and trainer aircraft to hit targets daily in the north, the east, the south and in rebel strongholds on the edges of the capital of Damascus.

“The aim of the airstrikes appears to be to terrorize civilians from the air, particularly in the opposition-controlled areas where they would otherwise be fairly safe from any effects of fighting,” Ole Solvang of Human Rights Watch told The Associated Press….

A Sunni-Shiite Showdown in Syria?
By Dale Gavlak | April 15, 2013

……Joshua Landis, who directs the University of Oklahoma’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies, sees Syria turning into an arena for a ‘Sunni-Shiite showdown,’ of potentially ‘apocalyptic’ proportions.

“Syria means a lot to Islamists [salafists],” Landis said. “Iraq for them has not been successful. The U.S. is still hunting and killing militants in Afghanistan and Yemen, but Syria presents a completely different possibility where the potential gains for them are real.”

Proxy wars

They have their sights set on removing Syria from Iran’s orb of Shiite influence and reasserting Sunni Muslim control over the country.

Moreover, the salafists and the West are seeking the same initial objective in Syria: the fall of the Assad regime. But what is hoped for afterward is radically different. Some believe the West and secular rebels want to see democracy flourish after decades of dictatorial rule, while militants say they will fight for the establishment of an Islamic state governed by ‘sharia’ or Islamic law.

“The fall of Assad would be a tremendous blow to Hezbollah, Iraq and Iran. The stakes are high even for the Sunni Muslims and jihadists,” Landis said.

He said jihadists from Sunni areas of Iraq and as far afield as Chechnya are flocking to Syria to fight. The same can be said for Shiites. Landis points to the upsurge in funerals of Hezbollah, Iraqi and Iranian fighters as one indication of the numbers of foreign Shiite fighters involved in the conflict. “It’s gaining pace,” he said.

A spokesman for the Free Syrian Army rebels, Loay al-Mikdad, claims that Hezbollah has expanded its operations over the past two months, mostly in central Homs province near the Lebanese border, and in Damascus, where Assad’s grip on the capital is weakening and more military defections are feared.

Hezbollah’s role in Syria is crucial, said Torbjorn Soltvedt, at the British risk analysis firm, Maplecroft, because it is more adept at fighting an irregular conflict than the Syrian regime troops trained for conventional warfare.

Shiite awakening

….Landis said the apex of Shiite power in the region was the Israel-Hezbollah war in July 2006 in which the Lebanese Shiite militant group claimed victory. Then, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was lauded even in Sunni Muslim capitals at the time. Shiites had also consolidated their political hold over Iraq, while Iran faced off with its Gulf Arab neighbors. A “Shiite awakening” was breaking out.

Shiites believed they lived under the heel of Sunni Muslims for far too long — the past 1,400 years — and were marginalized during the Ottoman Empire. But then the 1979 Islamic Revolution erupted in Iran, witnessing Shiite ascent to power.

“They don’t want to go back to the dark corner of the political halls of power, Landis said.

“But now, Sunni Muslims are on the march. They see the potential to compensate for Iraq in a big way,” he said of the Syrian conflict.

Landis also said that Syria’s Alawites and Shiites fear ethnic cleansing, seeing Iraqi Christians and minorities in Eastern Europe suffer that fate. “It’s a battle for survival,” he said.

He believes that we are witnessing a “big sorting out along ethnic and religious lines” in Syria, which could be part of the “painful process of nation-building.”

Islamist-Held Raqqa a Bellwether for Syria’s Rebellion
By: Balint Szlanko | Briefing

One feature sets the Syrian city of Raqqa apart from other towns captured by Syria’s rebels: The Syrian rebellion’s traditional flag — green, white and black with three red stars, representing the moderate views of the original rebel movement — is nowhere to be seen. Instead, a black flag bearing a verse from the Quran flies over Raqqa’s main square — a flag often associated with Sunni Islamist extremists.

CORKER WARNS OF LACK OF CLARITY IN US SYRIA STRATEGY, CALLS FOR POST-ASSAD PLAN AND CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION PRIOR TO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN US INVOLVEMENT, Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN) News Release

In Syria, Follow the Money to Find the Roots of the Revolt
by Majid Rafizadeh Apr 8, 2013 – The Daily Beast

Economic liberalization without political reform to spread that wealth triggered the civil war, writes Majid Rafizadeh.

The media have paid a considerable amount of attention to political analyses that focus on the authoritarian, totalitarian, and corruptible character of Bashar al-Assad’s government. However, scarce attention has been given to one of the crucial factors that have contributed to the ongoing revolt against the police-state of Syria and other Arab states. Assad’s neoliberal policies and economic liberalization—without the political reforms to redistribute the wealth—severely exacerbated the inequality between the poor and the rich. In middle-class areas and cities, the separation was especially felt. While a small portion of the crony capitalists, business class, and loyalists to Assad were able to benefit from these policies, the vast majority of the population was disenfranchised. The regime attacked the worker and peasant unions in the country, viewing them as obstacles to the neoliberal policies, by not providing them with funds that they needed to continue to function…..

These policies of Bashar al-Assad were directly intended to transfer the “public asset” into the hands of crony capitalists, privileged networks, and corporations in order to increase the wealth of his inner circle. Unlike his father, Hafez, Bashar also sought to decrease the reliance of the Syrian regime on Russia and Iran by expanding the scope of the sweetening deals that the regime would receive from foreign and other Arab corporations. At this time, the regime’s policies and politico-economic and sociopolitical agenda departed heavily from the original Baath Party’s slogans voicing socialist and Arab nationalistic sentiments and aspirations. These sweeping changes left the Syrian people in a dire state of need and neglect…..

Although Bashar al-Assad appeared to be successful, in that moment, with his method of gradual liberalization, authoritarian upgrading, and readjustment of the economy to the advantage of the few privileged, the neoliberal change failed to correspond and did not go hand in hand with redistribution and political liberalization.

SAS News

Regime forces are hammering the key Eastern Ghouta town of Outaibah. If they capture it, it would mean a victory that would block the rebels’ supply route to eastern Damascus. Our coverage has strengthened with a new partnership with the Shahed Network, a network of citizen journalists based in and around Damascus. The network provides independent and credible reporting from inside the capital and its suburbs that we translate into English. Arabic speakers can follow their news on the شاهد من قلب الحدث Facebook page.

Mile-long line of Syrians fleeing into Turkey

If you haven’t yet watched it, allow me to strongly encourage you to view the Frontline documentary Syria Behind the Lines. Superior even to this documentary, however, is a segment of extra footage from the journalist who filmed the documentary (Olly Lambert). A single, unbroken walk-through of just one day in just one village in the Syria conflict, narrated by Lambert himself, the work is simultaneously enlightening as to the journalist’s own experience and to that of the people in the community featured, beyond what the primary documentary (or most documentaries for that matter) can offer. A masterful piece of footage and commentary, please view (full screen recommended): The Bombing of al-Bara. Witnessing a single afternoon in al-Bara is a sobering experience when considering that it is just one example of a reality being experienced in countless locations in Syria every day.

Attack on Ghabagheb

Destruction in Ghabagheb

One such recent location was the locale of Ghabagheb and nearby al-Sanamayn, attacked on the 10th of April. The day of the attack, a friend from Ghabagheb wrote saying: “The regime attacked my town today, they used tanks, cannons, missiles, nine people were killed one of them is a friend of mine (Ebraheem Alhorany) I have never seen him without a smile on his face… a house about 150m from ours was completely  destroyed.” In his conversation with me, he said that the regime attacked the town “for no reason.” I’m certain it felt that way for everyone in the town, but emerging reports claimed that the army’s motivation was to go after defectors who had taken refuge in the area. Of course, the communities were collectively punished with the usual brutality leaving women and children dead, houses destroyed, and numbers of men rounded up and executed. Ghabagheb and al-Sanamayn are located in the Dera’a muhafiza on the main highway, but are so far north within it that they are actually closer to Damascus than to the city of Dera’a. Areas within the muhafiza that previously avoided direct conflict (including parts of the north) are seeing intensified action after earlier rebel gains in the southern part of the muhafiza.

Destruction in Ghabagheb

Al-Sanamayn (C on the map) suffered even more than Ghabagheb (D on the map). On April 10, videos emerged indicating that a massacre occurred there. Syria Video contains examples showing mass graves, large numbers of bodies, and the bodies of women and children. This Sham News Network report documents the names of 49 deceased victims. This all4Syria report explains that the attack happened after a meeting between the village elders of Sanamayn and the commanders of the 9th Division, in which the commander threatened the elders, saying that he would “burn the village” if they would not hand over soldiers who had defected and were hiding in the village.

Many other towns have been attacked by the regime in the period since these events, but we mention these incidents to highlight the situation facing the Dera’a muhafiza, contributing to the mounting problem of refugees fleeing southern Syria for Jordan. Fighting is continuing in locations around the Dera’a muhafiza, with daily skirmishes in Kherbet Ghazalah, a strategically-important site that the army wants to win back from the rebels. Videos emerging from the village (B on the map) indicate an ongoing battle for the control of the Damascus-Dera’a City highway passing near the town. Commentators in videos recorded and uploaded daily keep count of the number of days they’ve been successful in repelling government attempts to secure the highway and keep ammunition flowing to the governorate capital, Dera’a city. They named the confrontations The Horan Bridge Battle (معركة جسر حوران) ,and yesterday was the 44th day. Another video shows a checkpoint near the village, heavy explosions and gunfire in the background.

Other videos show daily casualties: rebels, more rebels, families, and the last moments of the media activists recording and uploading the videos—and their funerals.

The conflict in Dera’a has also seen the recent destruction of the historical Omari Mosque in the city of Dera’a, an icon of the beginning of the uprising. (Several previous reports of the mosque’s destruction during the development of the conflict had turned out to be fabricated, but it seems that now it is finally the case.) The mosque had been a field hospital in the early days of the uprising. Newer videos show the aftermath of the recent destruction.

The past week has produced a number of stories of regime successes in Idlib and other provinces, but there have also been sporadic reports of successful rebel counter-offensives retaking important sites. In Dera’a it’s difficult to say which way the pendulum is swinging, but amidst growing talk of an overall “stalemate,” it’s clear that it is not a static stand-off; both sides are exhibiting a tough determination responsible for the back-and-forth pattern of gains and losses.

As the conflict lengthens, the number of villages that have evaded direct military assault grows less and less as fighting constantly moves into new locations, as Ghabagheb has experienced. A recent video revealed that a military base in Busr al-Harir (eastern Dera’a, right on the Sweida border), responsible for transportation and ammunition, was surrounded by rebels. The regime campaign to regain control in Dera’a is directly influencing growing levels of refugees entering Jordan (a 331% increase within just four months), something that is stretching the Jordanian state’s coping capacity to the maximum.

The Exodus

The violence of these ongoing contests has made life impossible in many towns, fueling more surges of refugees from Dera’a into Jordan. Refugees are exiting Syria through every border, but Jordan has seen the highest influx of people on the run. We’ve created the following graphs based on the most recent UN data. Lebanon was previous host to the largest number of refugees until Jordan moved into first place. The first two charts are derived from the UN count of “total persons of concern” which include both those already registered and those awaiting registration.

The governments of the states hosting the refugees offer their own estimates with numbers exceeding those accounted for by the UN so far:

UN numbers place Jordan in the lead as host, but as governments report, Lebanon is hosting the highest number of refugees. It is possible that Lebanon maintains a high estimate because it wants to include a large number of Syrians who already had extended family systems or secondary housing in Lebanon and who have now relocated there permanently but who do not refer to themselves as refugees. Many Syrians already have long-term connections to Lebanon. (Other reasons could be responsible as well.)

The following two charts show change in the number of refugees over the last 4 months and are based only on registered persons (they do not include those waiting to be registered).

Actual numbers of UN registered refugees between December 24 and April 17:

Based on these changes, the percentage of increase for each country over the last four months is as follows:

Of the bordering countries, Iraq has received the least number of refugees. The biggest percentage of recent increase has occurred in Egypt, but the number of refugees it has received is far less than that of any of the bordering countries. Based on these percentages, the average of increase for bordering countries for the last four months would be 237.75, and Jordan is 1.58 standard deviations above average, which suggests an abnormal level of increase. Though all countries have witnessed significant increases, the likelihood is very strong that something is different about Jordan. The heightened war activity occurring in Dera’a is certainly part of it, but refugees also come to Jordan from other parts of Syria.

The UN’s current total of Syrian refugees (total persons of concern) for today, April 21, is 1,369,206. Government estimates put the number at 1,970,000, which do not include Iraq; adding Iraq’s UN count (133,840) breaks 2 million (bringing the total to 2,103,840). Other reports put 4 million more Syrians displaced inside Syria. This means that close to 1/4 of the Syrian population (or even more) are currently displaced.

The particularly severe burden that this is placing on these states has prompted tension and outbursts recently in the Jordanian parliament. In a recent chaotic session, a shouting match ensues following MP Mohammed al-Dawayima’s demand that those with Palestinian documents and children of Jordanian women married to non-Jordanian men be given the same rights as Syrian refugees:

In the same session, MP Maysar al-Sardia delivered some alarming statements. She asked the Jordanian government to begin searching for an alternative homeland for the Jordanian people, who she said have been taking in refugees from 1948 to the present, stating that they can’t cope with it any longer. She questioned why Syrians from northern and western Syria flee to Jordan instead of to Turkey and Lebanon, and suggested that the Jordanian government discuss this with those countries, also asserting that though Obama gives aid to the Syrian refugees, Americans will make back all of those donations through reconstruction projects that they’ll have when the war is finished. She deplored the phenomenon of Gulf Arab males visiting the refugee camps to exploit the vulnerable through “pleasure marriages.” (The temporary “mut’a marriage” is a Shi’i institution, but a Sunni practice called “misyar” can fulfill the same function.) In her attack on this trend, she referred to Arab Countries (her comments seem directed primarily at Saudi Arabia and Qatar) as “the Jews of Khaybar” (a reference to a community of Arabian Jews near Medina who underwent a war with the Prophet Mohammed; in other words, she is calling those she castigates enemies of Islam). These and similar statements have led to Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh apologizing to the Qatari and Saudi ambassadors.

Some Syrians choose to brave the situation back in Syria rather than remain in the Jordanian camps: Syrian Refugees Return from Jordan

Jordan has allowed 3,900 Syrian refugees to return to their home country over the last three years following protests against the poor living conditions in the Zaatari refugee camp.  A total of 32,409 Syrian refugees have returned from Jordan since the outbreak of the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad in March 2011.

The refugees requested to return to Syria and received the approval of the Jordanian authorities after a series of protests at the Zaatari refugee camp, located 58 km northeast of Amman, during which dozens of people were arrested and interrogated, according to the camp’s head.

The return of refugees to Syria is miniscule in contrast with the flow of people in the opposite direction.  Approximately 2,000 Syrians cross the border into Jordan every day to escape the violence, according to UN figures.

It has been reported that some Syrians are taking advantage of their refugee status to gather supplies Jordan, which they then bring back to Syria before returning to Jordan with other groups of refugees.

… The constant flow of Syrian refugees has aggravated the economic crisis in Jordan, contributing to a split in the country’s political class between those who are for or against the regime in Damascus.

Refugees don’t take kindly to Jordanian authorities telling them when they can or can not leave. As the above article mentioned, some come to the Jordan camps just to collect goods to take back into Syria. Safety is also a concern motivating the authorities restrictions: A riot broke out among Syrian refugees after Jordanian authorities prevented Syria-bound buses from transporting them back to their country, due to the increased level of warfare in Dera’a. Riots in the camps are not isolated events, but continue:

10 Jordanian police injured at Syrian refugee camp

A Jordanian official says 10 Jordanian policemen have been injured in a riot that erupted at a Syrian refugee camp near the Jordan-Syria border. Anmar Hmoud says the Friday afternoon riot in Zaatari camp occurred after handful of refugees tried to sneak out of the camp.

Hmoud, a government spokesman for the Syrian refugee camps in Jordan, says that when police stopped them, 100 other refugees turned up, showering the policemen with stones. Police say tear gas was used to disperse the crowd.

Videos of the riots and Jordanian riot police can be seen on Syria Video here, here and here. According to video information, the incident started after a family tried to leave to the camp but was pushed back by the police.

Water is a significant issue for the country: Will Syria’s Refugee Crisis Drain Jordan of its Water? – Time

Jordan is one of the most water-stressed countries in the world, subject to an ongoing drought that has devastated agricultural prospects in the country’s northern areas for nearly a decade. The large and rapid influx of Syrian refugees into the border cities of Ramtha and Mafraq, home to the Za’atari refugee camp, has strained water supplies to the breaking point — for two weeks in February, parts of Mafraq town had no water whatsoever. Summer’s soaring temperatures will put additional demands on a poor region that can hardly support its own population, let alone the surge of new refugees that are expected as the war in Syria grinds on. When the peaceful Syrian uprising evolved into a bloody conflict nearly two years ago, residents of Mafraq welcomed refugees fleeing the violence. That hospitality is starting to wane. Competition between Syrian refugees and local residents over limited resources, from water to electricity, food, schooling, housing and health care could boil over, potentially causing unrest in one of the few stable countries left in the Middle East. “As temperatures rise, so too will tensions,” says Nigel Pont, Middle East Regional Director for Mercy Corps, an international development agency actively involved with the Syrian crisis. Resentment among the Jordanians is palpable, he adds, and could easily escalate into violence if the underlying issues are not addressed.

Aid is not enough for the 2,000 to 3,000 (the latter figure from the Time article above) entering Jordan every day: Jordan Needs Support

“Jordan urgently needs the support of the international community in order to cope with the immense necessities of the hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees whom it harbours on its territory. Merely fulfilling the basic needs of the 140,000 Syrian refugees placed in the Za’atri camp, which our delegation visited, costs a million dollars a day. And over 2 000 new refugees are arriving at Za’atri every day,” Josette Durrieu (France, SOC), Chair of the Assembly Sub-Committee on the Middle East, declared today after their visit to Jordan on 6 and 7 April.

Canada sends $13 million in aid, the US sends $200 million, Russia sends a few plane-fulls.

“U.S. feeds Syrians, but secretly” – Washington Post

In the heart of rebel-held territory in Syria’s northern province of Aleppo, a small group of intrepid Westerners is undertaking a mission of great stealth. Living anonymously in a small rural community, they travel daily in unmarked cars, braving airstrikes, shelling and the threat of kidnapping to deliver food and other aid to needy Syrians — all of it paid for by the U.S. government.

So secretive is the operation, however, that almost none of the Syrians who receive the help are aware of its American origins. Out of concern for the safety of the recipients and the delivery staff, who could be targeted by the government if their affiliation to the United States were known, the Obama administration and the aid workers have chosen not to advertise the assistance.

… “America has done nothing for us. Nothing at all,” said Mohammed Fouad Waisi, 50, spitting out the words for emphasis in his small Aleppo grocery store, which adjoins a bakery where he buys bread every day. The bakery is fully supplied with flour paid for by the United States. But Waisi credited Jabhat al-Nusra — a rebel group the United States has designated a terrorist organization because of its ties to al-Qaeda — with providing flour to the region. “If America considers itself a friend of Syria, it should start to do something,” he said.

Source: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Washington Post.

The UN has announced it will have to cancel food aid to 400,000 refugees in Lebanon if it doesn’t receive more funding (Reuters):

The cash shortage is part of a wider financial shortfall that the organization says is threatening its efforts to help nearly 1.3 million Syrian refugees and almost 4 million more people displaced inside Syria by the two-year conflict. “The speed with which the crisis is deteriorating is much faster than the ability of the

international community to finance the Syrian humanitarian needs,” Panos Moumtzis, the U.N. refugee agency’s regional coordinator for Syrian refugees said.

…All refugees currently receive food when they register and then get monthly food coupons worth $27 a month, Labande said…

The United Nations says that so far only $400 million out of more than $1.5 billion pledged by international donors in late January to cover Syrian refugee needs for the first six months of this year has actually been committed.

New camp opened, Jordanians frustrated – France Press

Jordan, already straining from hosting hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees, is increasingly feeling the heat from its own citizens who are fed up with the growing influx.

Jordan says it is hosting more than 500,000 Syrian refugees and the authorities last week opened a new refugee camp in the Mrigeb al-Fuhud area east of the capital Amman as thousands continue to flee the war across the border. The 13,000-acre (5,200-hectare) camp, built and run by the United Arab Emirates northeast of Amman, has 750 caravans, a hospital and a school and can accommodate 5,500 people. The seven-million-dinar ($9.8-million, 7.5-million euro) facility was opened nine months after Jordan set up the sprawling Zaatari camp that houses 150,000 Syrian refugees outside the northeastern city of Mafraq.

Now Jordanians, who are already suffering from high unemployment, prices and inflation as well as poverty, accuse the refugees of taking their jobs and prompting greedy landlords to raise rents. “More than 160,000 Syrians hold various jobs in Jordan, though most do not have work permits,” Hamda Abu Nejmeh, secretary general at the labour ministry, told AFP. “It is a huge number that has a very negative impact.” He said Syrians “are depriving Jordanians from having jobs. If this continues, unemployment will rise and our plans to help citizens work will be affected negatively.”

Abu Nejmeh said Syrians accept less than the monthly minimum wage of 190 dinars ($268, 203 euros) and work longer hours. Unemployment is officially around 14 percent in the country of 6.8 million people, 70 percent of them under 30, but other estimates put the figure at 30 percent.

“Rents have doubled in the (northern) cities of Ramtha and Irbid. An apartment that is usually rented for 125 dinars a month now costs 250 dinars,” said Fathi Bashabsheh, who owns a housing complex in Ramtha where 35 Syrian families live.

“Around 130,000 people live in Ramtha now, including 40,000 Syrians. This is a problem for Ramtha residents who face many problems in finding jobs and renting houses and shops.” …

More Syrian Refugees will Cause Crisis in Jordan

“We cannot keep paying for refugees while the international community is showing little support. We need more help or pressure will mount to close the borders,” a senior Jordanian government official told The Media Line.

… “I do not advise any refugees to return to Syria, they will face certain death. People in Dael are waiting for the bombing to stop and then plan to leave for Jordan,” he added. The rebels say they are powerless to stop people from returning, which is a personal choice, but had issued warnings about doing so which were not always heeded.

… Abu Hamza, leader of the rebels’ Houran Brigades, meanwhile said the rebels would not wait for an international resolution to establish a no-fly zone in Syria. “We have enough anti-aircraft missiles to create a no-fly zone,” he told The Media Line, adding, “We only need to advance near the border and push government forces out.”

Photograph: IBL / Rex Features

Buffer Zones

The discussion of buffer zones grew as the reality of Syrian territory controlled by hardline Islamists became clearer. First there was the plan to bolster the nationalist opposition:

Jordan to spearhead Saudi Arabian arms drive – Guardian – Fears over rising power of al-Qaida-linked groups drives move to channel weapons to moderate rebel fighters through Jordan

Jordan has agreed to spearhead a Saudi-led push to arm rebel groups through its borders into southern Syria, in a move that coincides with the transfer from Riyadh to Amman of more than $1bn (£650m).

It marks a significant change for Jordan, from a policy of trying to contain the spillover threat posed by the civil war across its border to one of actively aiming to end it before it engulfs the cash-strapped kingdom.

Jordan’s role as a conduit for arms has emerged in the past two months as Saudi Arabia, some Gulf states, Britain and the US have sharply increased their backing of some rebels to try to stop the advances of al-Qaida-linked groups among them.

A push to defeat al-Qaida, rather than an outright bid to oust Syria’s leader, Bashar al-Assad, is Jordan’s driving force. Officials in Amman concede it heightens a risk of retaliation from its increasingly cornered neighbour.

But beyond the problem of al-Qaida’s influence on the ground, the destabilization of Dera’a through the intensified battle between the regime and the rebels is pointing toward a destabilization of the border. This weekend alone, almost 8,000 new refugees have entered Jordan. The possibility of creating a buffer zone is gaining currency in Jordan, who on Thursday revealed that they would be hosting US troops. Al-Monitor:

Jordan acknowledged for the first time yesterday [April 18] that it would be hosting American troops. At the same time, it emphasized its rejection of any military intervention in Syria, and called for a comprehensive political solution that halts the cycle of violence there. This comes amid reports that Amman is considering the creation of a buffer zone in Daraa, Syria, to stop the flow of Syrian refugees into its territory.

Government spokesman Mohammed Mumuni said, “The US Department of Defense suggested deploying 200 troops on our territory, in light of the security repercussions that may result from the Syrian crisis.”

He added: “The kingdom’s position regarding what is going on in Syria has not changed. Jordan is against any military intervention, and calls for a comprehensive political solution that halts the cycle of violence and bloodshed there.” He stressed that “sending members from the US army to Jordan is part of the standard joint cooperation between the Jordanian armed forces and the US Army.”

A Jordanian army official, however, said: “Sending 200 US troops has nothing to do with the situation in Syria.” Speaking to the official Jordanian news agency [Petra], he said, “These soldiers represent the first unit among others that will take part in the Eager Lion exercise, which is held annually in Jordan.”

… The Jordanian government is considering using the city of Daraa, which is the largest in southern Syria, to test the possibility of creating a buffer zone there and its ability to contain the conflict and its repercussions.

Images from the camps:

(Chris Jackson/Getty Images)

(Bulent Kilic/AFP/Getty Images)

(Chris Jackson/Getty Images)

From al-Akhbar article, below: A young Syrian boy holds a bag as he collects plastic and metal items in a garbage dump in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo on 17 April 2013. (Photo: AFP -Dimitar Dolkoff)

The State of the Regime

Some believe that the clearer identification of Jabhat al-Nusra as al-Qaida will benefit the Syrian regime by drawing sentiment away from the rebels. Others, however, see the possible stepping-up of an effort to back nationalist rebels who offer an alternative to Islamists as a death knell for the regime, as it would be opposed by both battle-hardened mujahideen and Western-trained forces. Regardless of the ultimate outcome, observers believe the regime has had a good week:

Assad’s Forces Break Rebel Blockade in North Syria – Reuters – by Erika Solomon

Syrian government troops have broken through a six-month rebel blockade in northern Syria and are now fighting to recapture a vital highway, opposition and state media said on Monday. Rebels had kept the army bottled up in the Wadi al-Deif and Hamidiya military bases in Idlib province. But on Sunday, President Bashar al-Assad’s forces outflanked the rebels and broke through, the pro-government al-Baath newspaper said. The insurgents counter-attacked on Monday but their front has been weakened in recent weeks due to infighting and the deployment of forces to other battles, activists said. The break-out from the bases, located outside Maarat al-Nuaman town, may enable the army to recapture the main route into Aleppo, Syria’s largest city, and bolster their fragile supply lines in the heart of the rebel-held north.

… Activists in Maarat al-Nuaman, which has faced daily air strikes due to the blockade, accused rebels of causing their own defeat by depleting their forces in the area. Islamist units that moved in over the weekend accused forces on the ground, lead by the Martyrs of Syria brigade, of failing to secure the base and sending away too many fighters. The Martyrs of Syria brigade said they were pushing their campaign and the Islamist groups had hurt their blockade by interfering.

According to Abdelrahamn, many of the main fighting units previously based in the area had moved to Raqqa, Ras al-Ain, and Hassakah, towns in the northeast which rebels recently seized.

Assad forces try to consolidate gains in Maaret al-Numan – Daily Star

… the “tactical gains could increase the regime’s chances of retaking the north-south highway”…

Battle for Damascus: Regime Fights on Four Fronts – al-Akhbar

Are we Seeing Bashar al-Assad’s Second Wind? by Stephen Starr

Talks of tipping points, battles for Damascus and a regime on its last legs have all proved to be false dawns over the past number of months. So just how badly off is President Bashar al-Assad’s government?

On the battlefield, the regime has proved stubbornly resistant. In the north, government forces on Sunday broke out of their Wadi al-Deif and Hamidiya military bases and outflanked rebels that had been besieging them for months, according to both activists and pro-government media. Districts of central Homs have been retaken by the government in recent weeks and rebels have been successfully fought off in Quneitra, along the Syrian-Israeli demilitarized zone.

Aleppo International Airport, a strategic asset for the regime in the north, was thought to have been close to falling into rebel hands in February. It hasn’t happened. Baba Amr, a symbol of resistance in Homs, was retaken by government forces last month.

… Furthermore, Syria’s Western-backed political opposition has clearly been caught out in its own backing of Jabhat al-Nusra – an Islamist fighting force now openly aligned with Al-Qaeda.

To state the obvious, Western capitals cannot support elements of the Syrian opposition that may have Al-Qaeda ties. France, Britain and others pushing for the arming of rebels certainly won’t be able to sell this to their respective populations with al-Qaeda in the mix. The ties between Syria’s opposition and its international sponsors may well be torn over the status of Jabhat al-Nusra, today the most successful fighting force taking on Mr. Assad.

Mr. Assad has mostly delivered on the promises and threats he has made over the duration of the uprising. Early on he spoke of “ten Afghanistans” in Syria should outside forces intervene, or fundamentalist takfiris and Islamic extremists dominating the opposition. Though clearly propaganda at the time, today it is difficult to dismiss his argument, a perspective that resonates with the millions of Syrians exhausted by two years of conflict and instability.

… The declaration of an al-Qaeda presence in Syria in the form of Nusra complicates the conflict even further: the Assad regime will say it has been proven right, as will Russia, China and Hezbollah. For Western observers, the presence of such a foe means that no one can entertain the notion of giving weapons to forces that may sympathize with an al-Qaeda ideology.

In addition, it divides Syria’s political opposition even more. And al-Qaeda on the battlefield creates a quandary for other rebel groups: Do they bed down with these well-organized crazies or continue the lonely fight?

Amidst the discussion of military advances for the regime, Robert Fisk discusses another important development also related to the military, namely that the former power of mukhabaraat entities is being replaced by the more visible power of the military. Previously I discussed how “the Ba’athist cult of unreality” prevents an open discussion (even of something as important as territorial losses in the conflict) from taking place in the Syrian parliament. Fisk’s article, “President Assad’s army is starting to call the shots in Syria,” underscores this ever-paradoxical dilemma before discussing the changing power dynamics he observes:

Old Mohamed Said al-Sauda from Deraa, in his tawny gown and kuffiah headscarf, sat at the end of a conclave of tribal elders, all newly arrived in Damascus for an audience with no less than the President himself. They sat – only one woman in a blue dress among them – round a long table in the Damas Rose Hotel drinking water and coffee, rehearsing their anxieties. How should they talk to the young armed men who came into their villages? How should they persuade the rebels not to damage their land and take over their villages? “We try to talk to the saboteurs and to get them to go back to rebuilding the country,” al-Sauda told me. “We try to persuade them to put aside their arms, to stop the violence. We used to have such a safe country to live in.”

These men, middle-aged for the most part with tough, lined, dark faces, are the first line of defence of the Assad regime, the landowners and propertied classes of the peasants who benefited most from the original Baathist revolution and whose prosperity has been threatened by the mass uprising against the regime. They come from Tartus, Deraa, the Damascus countryside, from Hama and Latakia, and they speak the language of the Assad government – up to a point. “Syria is a mosaic unlike any other in the world,” says Salman Hamdan. “The sectarian divide does not exist in our country. Muslims, Christians, they are the same…”

But the woman in blue hands me a printed sheet of paper with a list of demands. “We come from all walks of political life,” it begins. “We reject violence and we reject repression, sectarian massacres and the destruction of the cultural heritage of Syria.” And there it was. That word. Repression. For these men and this lonely woman know what helped to set fire to Syria. “Every government makes mistakes,” one of the men says – but we know what he means. He is talking about the mukhabarat intelligence service which lit the fire two years ago by its brutality towards the children of Deraa. The system of torture and fear that the secret police services of the regime imposed for decades upon Syria – the “repression” mentioned so obliquely in the lady’s demands – still lies like a blanket over those areas of the country that the government still controls.

How does a Syrian loyal to the regime tell its leader that his own security agencies helped to bring down this catastrophe upon their country? For these agencies have contaminated not just the Baath and the President but even the government army – the Syrian Arab Army – which is now trying to shrug off the awful carapace of legimitised violence that the plain-clothes men, in their tens of thousands, have used as a tool for more than 30 years. Even in the cities that the government still controls they have still not learned their lesson.

The country’s brutal secret services are no longer the power they once were. Other forces are at work

… There are also some intriguing signs that the government army, so keen to appear as the foundation stone of the state – which it is – without the dark stain of fear left by the mukhabarat, is taking its own steps to push back the “terror” men. The military security forces, now that they have – for the first time – to deal directly with their own civilians, are giving orders over the heads of the intelligence agencies. In 2010, Assad himself took a decision to ban security agents from carrying weapons covertly – a highly contentious rule for the secret police – and the army has now followed on from this.

The army, for example, is today in command of security in battle. In the past, military intelligence men would give instructions to the army. But the Syrian army is now in charge. Field commanders – not cops – make decisions. There have been many cases, according to those involved with the military, where plain-clothes security agents witnessed brutalising civilians have been arrested and – incredibly – put before military courts. The generals and the colonels, in other words, are no longer prepared to play patsy to the regime’s thugs.

But romantics beware. The army is a ruthless machine and its commander-in-chief remains Bashar al-Assad. Its loyalty is still without question. The UN maintains voluminous files of war crimes that they say were committed by regular soldiers in the Syrian army. And the idea that the presidency itself may abandon its own security agents is a myth. A militarised state will always need a bodyguard of secret policemen. Nor will Assad’s enemies ever accept an army takeover – with or without an Assad leadership – as a compromise for a truce. For them – correctly – the army remains more dangerous than Assad himself. The mukhabarat may come and go, but the army remains.

… It is an irony of Syrian history that hitherto most threats to the regime have come from within the cities. The Muslim Brotherhood, still officially illegal in Syria, was an urban institution and it was the Brotherhood that threatened Damascus and the central cities of Homs and Hama in the 1980s. The great uprising of 1982 emanated from the centre of Hama, from the city’s mosques and underground tunnels; and thus the cruellest of the nation’s security forces, the Special Forces of Rifaat al-Assad – led by the president’s now-disgraced uncle – was sent in to liquidate the Brotherhood and up to 20,000 of Hama’s residents. But now the uprising comes from the countryside

That a regime originally founded on peasant reform should discover that its enemies now live among that same peasantry is a terrible stroke of history for Baathism. That a nation with a non-sectarian constitution – needless to say, we all know what is wrong with it – should find itself consumed by the very sectarian conflict that it was designed to prevent is a tragedy. No wonder the new 60-man special units of the government army being trained for operations across Syria are a careful mixture of all sects – Sunnis, Christians, Alawis, Druze and others – and are openly referred to as the most “colourful” of all military battalions. …

For the message – if there is one in the coming weeks and months – is that the most important institution to watch in Syria is not the regime. Nor is it Bashar al-Assad. Nor is it the secret police. Nor is it the Free Syrian Army, nor al-Nusrah. Nor the platitudes of the White House or Downing Street. It is the government Syrian Arab Army. Watch, as they say, this space.

Raqqa

Interesting article by Martin Kramer about Iranian influence and symbolism in Raqqa: The Shiite Crescent Eclipsed

… The upper inscription identifies this site as the shrine of two figures from seventh-century Islamic history, Ammar ibn Yasir and Uways al-Qarani. The façade is striking, but just what is the connection of this shrine in Raqqa to Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khameneh’i, and why is their portrait being defaced at its entrance?

As we shall see, the answer to that question establishes the short video clip as one of the most significant images to emerge from Syria’s civil war. It proclaims that the so-called “Shiite crescent” is now eclipsed.

… Raqqa is surrounded by semi-settled tribes, some branches of which believe they are descended from Husayn, the son of Ali and grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, who is the central figure of Shiite martyrology. They sometimes belong to Sufi orders that venerate Ali and Husayn. Unlike the city dwellers, who regarded the shrine project with surly resentment, they welcomed it as a kind of beautification project. They are Sunnis, not Shiites, but they seemed like promising targets for Iranian proselytization. Visiting Iraqi or Iranian preachers would bring them together at the shrine for sessions commemorating their supposed forebears (majalis husayniyya).

… After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iranian planners conceived an ambitious plan for a kind of pilgrimage trail, consisting of a chain of shrines from Karbala to Damascus. Following the battle of Karbala in 687, the Umayyad caliph Yazid ordered that the head of the defeated Husayn be brought to him in Damascus. The idea was to create a route of pilgrimage following the stations of the head’s journey, anchored at the midway point by the already existing shrine to Husayn in Aleppo. To this end, Iran began to invest in the renovation and expansion of other sites in Syria.

Still, a scholar who has studied the entire range of Iranian shrine projects in Syria has written that, more than any other such effort, the Raqqa shrine “best represents the extent of Shiite triumphalism and state support in Syria.”

What will become of the shrine itself is uncertain. A false Iranian report claimed it had been destroyed by Sunni extremists, but that didn’t happen and it is unlikely to happen, since veneration of the tombs was a local tradition even before the Iranians arrived. The site is likely to be purged of its explicitly Iranian and Shiite references, but it is impossible to know which symbols will replace them.

It could be any one of the flags now sold in Raqqa, as shown in this photo. From right to left are the flags of the Free Syrian Army (minimally present in Raqqa), Ahrar al-Sham (dominant), and the black-and-white variations of the jihadist flag flown by Jabhat al-Nusra (also a major force). The struggle that will elevate one of these symbols over the others has only just begun.

 Miscellaneous

Belgium asks Turkey to watch for Belgians crossing into Syria

Belgium has asked Turkey to help in its efforts to prevent Belgian nationals from illegally crossing into Syria to fight alongside opposition forces trying to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Belgian Raids Target Support for Syrian Rebels

Belgian police raided four dozen homes on Tuesday looking for potential extremists who lure youngsters into traveling to Syria to join rebels trying to overthrow the government there.

Officials say dozens of Belgian teenagers already have left for the Syrian front, willing to fight but ill-prepared to survive the Arab country’s brutal civil war. Belgian leaders worry that the young fighters could return from Syria radicalized and willing to stage terrorist attacks at home.

… The mayor of Mechelen, whose city saw some homes raided, said the police action was linked to the disbanded Islamic group Sharia4Belgium.

Authorities are trying to determine if the group is a terrorist outfit, and prosecutors allege that Sharia4Belgium members who had traveled to Syria linked up with “al-Qaida-inspired combatants.” Videos showed its former leader Fouad Belkacem being taken from his home in the pre-dawn sweep.

Robert Fisk: At a checkpoint, watching for bombs, the talk turned to religion

The UN is amassing war crimes indictments against all kinds of armed groups in Syria – the government army very much among them – but the fact remains that this conversation would have been impossible – unthinkable – before the uprising. The war has given a freedom of speech even to soldiers to debate among themselves, as they do, about the war.

Famed Turkish Pianist Fazıl Say Sentenced for Blasphemy

World-renowned Turkish pianist Fazıl Say was handed a suspended 10-month prison sentence today for “insulting religious beliefs held by a section of the society,” bringing to a close a controversial case while sparking fiery reaction in Turkey and abroad.

Egypt Update

After last week’s sectarian problems in Egypt, Islamopedia provides a number of useful stories:

Egyptians march against sectarianism

Hundreds of people marched in the Egyptian capital on Tuesday to condemn sectarianism and call for unity between Muslims and Christians.

Coptic Church submits demands to Morsy

The Coptic Orthodox Church has identified five demands for President Mohamed Morsy to resolve the sectarian crises that have erupted in various parts of the country.

“We demand the president to apply the law to everyone, ensure safety and security in the entire country, activate fully the principle of citizenship, amend religious discourse, and teach Coptic history in schools,” Father Makary Habib, the personal secretary to Pope Tawadros II, told the Turkish Anadolu News on Wednesday.

Bishop thanks Muslims for protecting Christians in Egypt’s Al-Khosous

A senior Coptic bishop has praised Muslims in Al-Khosous who attempted to protect Christians during a recent bout of sectarian violence that left five people dead.

“The loving Muslims who protected Christians and the church during the deadly clashes in Al-Khosous highlighted the mistakes of the fanatics and showed the true meaning of religion and love,” Bishop Moussa, who is in charge of youth affairs at the Coptic Orthodox Church, said in a statement on Wednesday.

Egyptian Endowments Ministry bans political sermons, suspends popular sheikh

“Because of my position against ‘Brotherhoodizing’ Al-Azhar and the state, and my defense of Al-Azhar and its [grand] sheikh, the minister of endowments issued a decision to suspend me before any interrogations were carried out. He assigned in my place one of the pro-Muslim Brotherhood group imams, without prior warning or interrogation, in violation of the law,” Shaheen said.